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Abstract: Counterfeit goods are becoming more sophisticated from shoes to infant milk powder and
aircraft parts, creating problems for consumers, rms, and governments. By comparing two types
of counterfeiters - deceptive, so inltrating a licit (but complicit) distributor, or non-deceptive in an
illicit channel, we provide insights into the impact of anti-counterfeiting strategies on a brand-name
company, a counterfeiter, and consumers. Our analysis highlights that the e¤ectiveness of these
strategies depends critically on whether a brand-name company faces a non-deceptive or decep-
tive counterfeiter. For example, by improving quality, the brand-name company can improve her
expected prot against a non-deceptive counterfeiter when the counterfeiter steals an insignicant
amount of brand value. However, the same strategy does not work well against the deceptive coun-
terfeiter unless high quality facilitates the seizure of deceptive counterfeits signicantly. Similarly,
reducing price works well in combating the non-deceptive counterfeiter, but it could be ine¤ec-
tive against the deceptive counterfeiter. Moreover, the strategies that improve the prot of the
brand-name company may benet the counterfeiter inadvertently and even hurt consumer welfare.
Therefore, rms and governments should carefully consider a trade-o¤ among di¤erent objectives
in implementing an anti-counterfeiting strategy.
Key words: Game Theory, Global Operations Management, Supply Chain Management
1 Introduction
Trademarks, also called brands, represent the most valuable assets of many rms, requiring signi-
cant investment in research and development as well as years of e¤orts in maintaining high product
quality and careful brand management. Famous global brands such as GE, Nike and Nestlé are
popular because they o¤er a guarantee of quality, which is vital to consumers when they make
purchasing decisions. For those goods for which the mere display of a particular brand confers
prestige on their owners, such as luxury watches and fashion apparel, many consumers purchase
branded goods to demonstrate that they are consumers of the particular brand. These intrinsic
values of trademarks create incentives for counterfeiting.
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Nowadays counterfeits have developed into a substantial threat to many industries. The OECD
estimates that international trade in counterfeits could amount to $250 billion or 1.95% of world
trade in 2007 (OECD 2009). If including domestically produced and consumed products, the total
magnitude could be several hundred billion dollars more (OECD 2008). By 2015, the International
Chamber of Commerce expects the value of counterfeit goods globally to exceed $1.7 trillion (Har-
greaves 2012). The problem is no longer limited to prestigious and easy-to-manufacture products,
such as designer clothing, branded sportswear, and fashion accessories. It a¤ects nearly all product
categories including items that have an impact on personal health and safety such as pharmaceu-
ticals, food, drink, toys, medical equipment, and automotive parts (OECD 2008).
Counterfeits are broadly categorized into two types: non-deceptive and deceptive (Grossman
and Shapiro 1988a). A non-deceptive counterfeit is the counterfeit a consumer can distinguish
from the brand-name product at time of purchase. This type of counterfeits tends to be sold at
a substantial discount through an unauthorized sales channel. For example, counterfeiters in the
Chinese footwear industry used cheap materials to produce shoes, and they charged a small fraction
of the authentic products price to attract customers (Qian 2008). Consumers could easily tell that
$10 Nike shoes sold by street vendors are counterfeits. On the contrary, a deceptive counterfeit is the
counterfeit a consumer believes to be authentic at time of purchase even if it is, in fact, counterfeit.
In order to deceive consumers, this type of counterfeit goods has to inltrate licit supply chains. A
deceptive counterfeit is usually sold at the price that is the same as or close to that of its branded
product so as to deceive consumers. Although it appears to function properly at time of purchase,
it lacks durability and often involves health and safety risks of consumers. Examples of deceptive
counterfeits abound in both developing and developed countries. In Thailand, a Scotch whisky
company su¤ered a signicant loss due to counterfeit sales. Green and Smith (2002) report that the
counterfeiters received the active cooperation of many of the licit supply chain members. The licit
supply chain members were lured by the higher prots from selling counterfeits, which they could
obtain for a fraction of the brand-name companys wholesale price, yet charge the same amount
to consumers. In the U.S., a number of physicians and drug distributors have been prosecuted
recently for the purchase or sale of non-FDA approved cancer treatments including fake Avastin.
Doctors generated more prots by purchasing them at discounted price, while billing insurance,
Medicare and patients at the same price they would for legitimate treatments (Imber 2014).
In order to stop or at least to reduce the incidence of counterfeits, brand-name companies are
spending millions of dollars. They hire full-time employees, invest in new technologies, and redesign
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their products to make counterfeiting more di¢ cult. However, the anti-counterfeiting strategies
found to be useful to one product may not work for another or can even unintentionally make
counterfeits ourish more in the market. For example, Chinese shoe manufacturers successfully
addressed their counterfeiting issues by improving the quality of their products (Qian 2008). This
is the outcome of the competition in which high-quality authentic products defeat low-quality non-
deceptive counterfeits. However, the same strategy backred against the Scotch whisky company
mentioned above (Green and Smith 2002). At the peak of the companys sales in 1988, 42% of its
premium Scotch whisky sales was stolen by deceptive counterfeits. High quality made the products
more popular and attracted more counterfeits. After the initial attempt to combat counterfeits
through quality improvement had failed, the company eventually succeeded in radically reducing
the incidence of counterfeiting by establishing a system that monitors supply chains: the company
focused on identifying members in its supply chain who were selling the counterfeits, facilitating
seizure of counterfeits, and punishing counterfeiters.
These contrasting results illustrate a need for anti-counterfeiting strategies that are tailored
to specic products. Yet, due to the limited understanding of relations between the types of
counterfeits and the e¤ectiveness of anti-counterfeiting strategies, OECD (2008) calls for research
that strengthens the analysis of counterfeiting and says:
Assessing the factors driving production and consumption of counterfeit and pirated products can
generate insights into the types of products that are most likely to be infringed, . . . , and lead to
more e¢ cient and e¤ective [anti-counterfeiting] strategies.
This paper attempts to provide such an analysis by providing insights into the following questions:
(Q1) What anti-counterfeiting strategies should a brand-name company use to improve her own
prot? (Q2) What is the impact of anti-counterfeiting strategies on the prot of a counterfeiter?
(Q3) What is the impact of counterfeits on consumer welfare? Do consumers also benet from the
strategies that are e¤ective in combating counterfeits?
To answer these questions, we develop a normative model of licit and illicit supply chains, in
which a brand-name company competes with her potential counterfeiter. The counterfeiter in our
model is either non-deceptive or deceptive, and decides the level of functional quality and wholesale
price of his goods after observing the quality and price of the brand-name product. Depending on
his type, the counterfeiter faces di¤erent opportunities and risks. The non-deceptive counterfeiter
competes directly with a brand-name company for price and quality. Thus the counterfeiter has to
invest in improving the quality of his goods although large investment may not lead to any return
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in case of getting caught by the authorities. Conversely, the deceptive counterfeiter may not need
to invest as much in improving the quality as the non-deceptive counterfeiter (as long as he can
deceive consumers successfully at time of purchase), but he has to inltrate a licit supply chain via
a legitimate distributor who sources both brand-name and counterfeit products. The legitimate
distributor then faces a trade-o¤ between a greater prot margin and a risk of getting punished for
selling counterfeits.
After nding the equilibrium decisions of the counterfeiter and the distributor, we evaluate the
following anti-counterfeiting strategies of which the e¤ectiveness depends on the subsequent reaction
of the strategic counterfeiter: (i) quality strategy that alters the quality of brand-name products
against a counterfeiter, (ii) pricing strategy that alters the price of brand-name products against a
counterfeiter, (iii) marketing campaign that educates consumers about the dangers of counterfeits,
(iv) enforcement strategy that increases the chances to seize the production of counterfeits, and
(v) technology strategy that makes the brand-name product more di¢ cult to counterfeit. Our
analysis highlights that the optimal strategy of the brand-name company di¤ers depending on
whether she faces the non-deceptive or deceptive counterfeiter. Although it is ideal to see the
strategies that increase the prot of the brand-name company be also e¤ective in reducing the
prot of the counterfeiter and benet consumers, our analysis shows that this is not the case
for most strategies. It is therefore imperative for industries and governments to understand the
type of potential counterfeiters and to carefully consider a trade-o¤ among di¤erent objectives in
implementing an anti-counterfeiting strategy.
2 Literature Review
Traditional supply chain management research is focused on licit supply chains in which members
of supply chains interact with each other by exchanging goods and services legally. In this era of
globalization, supply chains are no longer conned within one country as more and more companies
o¤shore and outsource their operations to less developed countries. However, this has caused an
ever-rising ood of counterfeit items coming into markets. This paper is intended to shed light
on counterfeit problems in both licit and illicit supply chains and to analyze the e¤ectiveness of
anti-counterfeiting strategies.
The majority of studies on counterfeits are conceptual and descriptive. They provide frame-
works for ghting counterfeiting usually based on case studies (e.g., see Staake and Fleisch (2008)
for an extensive review). Marketing researchers have conducted empirical studies on counterfeits.
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They mainly focus on the demand side of counterfeits, and try to answer questions such as why con-
sumers purchase counterfeits and how to educate consumers not to purchase counterfeits. Eisend
and Schuchert-Guler (2006) review this literature and conclude that further investigation is needed
to develop a general framework that integrates existing results consistently. Recently, using data
from Chinese shoe companies, Qian (2008) nds that brand-name companies tend to improve their
product quality after the entry of non-deceptive counterfeiters.
There are only a handful of analytical studies that present prescriptive models of counterfeits.
Grossman and Shapiro (1988a, 1988b) develop equilibrium models of trades between brand-name
rms in a home country and low-quality producers in a foreign country. To sell their goods as
counterfeits in the home market, foreign producers must pass the goods through the home-country
border, hence facing the risk of conscation. Grossman and Shapiro (1988a) analyze the conse-
quences of deceptive counterfeits in a market where consumers cannot observe the quality of a
product, and provide a welfare analysis of border inspection policy. Grossman and Shapiro (1988b)
present a Cournot competition model between brand-name products and non-deceptive counterfeits
given their exogenous quality levels. Because non-deceptive counterfeits can contribute positively
to consumer welfare due to their lower price, the authors conclude that policies that discourage for-
eign counterfeiting need not improve welfare, which is consistent with our nding. Scandizzo (2001)
views competition between brand-name rms and non-deceptive counterfeiters as a patent race over
time. Liu et al. (2005) study the decision of an inventory manager who can source both genuine
and deceptive counterfeit products. Sun et al. (2010) study a global rms decision of outsourcing
the production of its components to a foreign country, in which the rm faces a trade-o¤ between
lower labor cost and increased risk of imitation by a foreign rm. Zhang et al. (2012) analyze the
case when a brand-name rm faces non-deceptive counterfeits. They show that a non-deceptive
counterfeit lowers the price and prot of the brand-name product, and a brand-name rm has more
incentive to improve her own quality rather than reducing that of a counterfeit.
We draw on and contribute to this stream of research by addressing the following important
issues in counterfeiting problems:
(1) Strategic counterfeiters: The common assumption used in the literature is that the quality is
xed a priori. Today, thanks to outsourcing and o¤shoring of numerous global rms, counterfeiters
benet greatly from increasingly easy access to modern production facilities (Staake and Fleisch
2008). Moreover, consumers also demand high quality from counterfeits (e.g., Nylander 2013). Due
to this change in both supply and demand sides of the counterfeit market, Schmidle (2010) notes
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that todays counterfeiters come in varying levels of quality depending on their intended markets.
In our model, a counterfeiter decides the functional quality and wholesale price of his product by
considering a trade-o¤ between the benet from stealing brand value and the risk of conscation.
Our analysis shows that the e¤ectiveness of anti-counterfeiting strategies depends critically on the
strategic response of a counterfeiter to those strategies.
(2) Licit and illicit supply chains: The previous analytical papers assume that a counterfeiter
is capable of selling his counterfeits directly to consumers regardless of his type. Although this
is quite possible for non-deceptive counterfeits, a deceptive counterfeiter has to inltrate a licit
supply chain; today, very few consumers would be deceived by the counterfeits sold by street
vendors or unknown websites. We take into account this fundamental di¤erence in supply chains
of non-deceptive and deceptive counterfeits, and demonstrate that an e¤ective strategy against a
non-deceptive counterfeiter may not be e¤ective against a deceptive counterfeiter.
(3) Consumer characteristics: As consumers learn more about counterfeit problems from the media,
they become more aware of the presence of counterfeits, and some even become more proactive
by taking into account the likelihood of receiving deceptive counterfeits unknowingly when they
purchase branded products from licit distributors. Our survey (presented in §3) indicates that
a proportion of proactive consumers in the U.S. is substantially lower than that in China. Our
analysis provides insights into how this characteristic of consumers a¤ects the e¤ectiveness of anti-
counterfeiting strategies.
(4) Evaluation of anti-counterfeiting strategies: We evaluate the aforementioned strategies by ex-
amining their impacts on a brand-name company, a counterfeiter, and consumers. Our analysis
complements Grossman and Shapiro (1988a, 1988b) for border inspection policies, and Zhang et
al. (2012) for the e¤ect of altering the quality of a brand-name good or a non-deceptive counterfeit
on the prot of a brand-name rm.
Finally, we note that a counterfeiters decision of his distribution channel is analogous to that of
a legitimate rm (e.g., Xu et al. 2010), although the benet and risk associated with each channel
of counterfeits are unique as described above. Also, a research question similar to counterfeiting
arises in the literature of parallel importing (or gray market) and software piracy. Parallel importing
is the practice of purchasing authentic products in a lower-priced region and shipping them to a
higher priced region (e.g., Hu et al. 2011 and references therein). In contrast, counterfeits are not
authentic, having lower quality, and deceptive counterfeits are often sold at the same price. Software
piracy can be viewed as a special case of counterfeiting, in which counterfeit products have almost
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the same functional quality as authentic ones but their cost of development and production is very
low. Some of our results can be extended to software piracy problems; for example, consumers
could be better o¤ without piracy protection, which is consistent with Conner and Rumelt (1991).
In summary, the literature considers only one type of counterfeits with xed quality that are sold
directly to consumers. In contrast, our model captures recent changes in counterfeiting supply and
demand by noting the fundamental di¤erences between non-deceptive and deceptive counterfeits
in consumers awareness and distribution channels, and by considering counterfeiters strategic
decisions regarding price and functional quality in a market with di¤erent consumer characteristics.
Our analysis provides novel insights into the e¤ectiveness of several anti-counterfeiting strategies.
3 Model
We consider a market served by a brand-name company (she) and her potential counterfeiter
(he). The type of the counterfeiter is either non-deceptive or deceptive. We use subscript i = B
to denote the brand-name product, i = N to denote the non-deceptive counterfeit, and i = D
to denote the deceptive counterfeit. A consumer in this market purchases at most one unit of a
product. In making a purchasing decision of product i, a consumer considers his/her utility ui =
i   pi, where  represents his/her taste, i represents the quality of the product a consumer
perceives at time of purchase, and pi represents the retail price of the product. All consumers
prefer high quality for a given price, but a consumer with a higher  is more willing to pay to
obtain a high-quality product. We assume that  is uniformly distributed over [0; 1] and that the
size of the market is one. A consumer purchases a product only if the utility from purchasing the
product is nonnegative in which case he/she selects a product that provides the highest utility. This
is the standard vertical di¤erentiation model, which is also used by Qian (2008) and Zhang et al.
(2012). We next present our model components that capture the unique aspects of counterfeiting.
Depending on the counterfeit type, the quality of product i a consumer perceives at time of pur-
chase, i, may di¤er from its real quality qi. (Throughout this paper, unless mentioned specically
as the perceived quality, quality refers to real quality.) For the non-deceptive counterfeit as well
as the brand-name product, consumers know what product they are purchasing, so the perceived
quality of either product is the same as its real quality; i.e., B = qB and N = qN . However, for
the deceptive counterfeit, consumers cannot distinguish it from the brand-name product at time
of purchase. There are two types of consumers. First, some consumers may not consider the like-
lihood of purchasing counterfeits at legitimate stores, or they may not be aware of counterfeits
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at all. They perceive the quality of any product in the market as qB; i.e., B = D = qB. On
the other hand, other consumers may be proactive in the sense that they take into account the
likelihood of receiving deceptive counterfeits unknowingly even when purchasing products from le-
gitimate stores. Let s 2 [0; 1] denote their expectation about the fraction of deceptive counterfeits
in the market. Then proactive consumers perceive the quality of a product in the market as a
weighted average of the quality of the brand-name product and that of the deceptive counterfeit;
i.e., B = D = (1 s)qB+sqD. Let  (2 [0; 1]) denote the fraction of proactive consumers in the
market. In practice,  may vary depending on the characteristic of the market. For example, our
survey of 166 consumers over 4 product categories popular for deceptive counterfeits reveals that
51% of consumers in China are proactive, whereas only 4 % of consumers in the U.S. are proactive
(see Table 1 and online appendix for more details). The low value of  in the U.S. reects the
view of Rocko¤ and Weaver (2012), who say: Most Americans dont question the integrity of the
drugs they rely on. They view drug counterfeiting, if they are aware of it at all, as a problem for
developing countries.
Table 1. Consumer Survey Results in the U.S. and China
U.S. China
Aware Proactive Aware Proactive
Alcohol 14% 4% 94% 56%
Car Parts 25% 4% 54% 34%
Medical Drugs 41% 5% 86% 51%
Food, Drinks 22% 5% 90% 63%
Average 26% 4% 81% 51%
Since the counterfeit bears the trademark of the brand-name product, a consumer enjoys the
brand image even when he/she purchases the counterfeit. Thus we may represent the quality of
the counterfeit as qi = fi + qB (i = N or D), where fi (> 0) is the functional quality of the
counterfeit i and qB (where  > 0) is the brand value that the counterfeit steals from the brand-
name product. The parameter  captures the following two factors. First,  captures a fraction
of the brand value in the quality of the brand-name product, qB. For example, this fraction may
be high for luxury goods because a brand plays a signicant role when consumers purchase such
products, whereas it may be low for fast moving consumer goods because a brand is less of a concern
to consumers for such goods. Second,  captures a discount factor of the original brand value for
the counterfeit because the counterfeit draws only a part of the brand value from the brand-name
product. Following the literature, we assume that the quality of the brand-name product is superior
to that of the counterfeit; i.e., qB > qN and qB > qD.
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Either type of counterfeiter i (= N or D) makes two decisions sequentially to maximize his
expected prot: functional quality fi and wholesale price wi to a distributor. We assume that
the counterfeiter makes these decisions after observing the quality qB and price pB of a brand-
name product because counterfeiters always enter a market following a brand-name company, often
after the brand-name product becomes popular. Di¤erent types of counterfeiters use di¤erent
distribution channels to sell their goods as we describe next.
The non-deceptive counterfeiter (i = N) distributes his goods through an illicit distributor, who
then decides the retail price of the non-deceptive counterfeit to consumers, pN . In this case, con-
sumers will choose between the brand-name product and the counterfeit. Both products carry the
same brand, but they have di¤erent qualities and prices. Competition between the non-deceptive
counterfeiter and the brand-name company is analogous to duopoly in a vertically di¤erentiated
market, but it is not the same because the non-deceptive counterfeit steals brand value from the
brand-name product and the members of the illicit supply chain bear the risks associated with
counterfeiting. The non-deceptive counterfeiter and the illicit distributor make their decisions in
three sequential stages as follows. In stage 1, the non-deceptive counterfeiter chooses his functional
quality fN 2 [f; f ] (where f > f  0), and invest tf2N (where t > 0) to develop and produce goods
having fN . The upper bound f may represent the functional quality of the brand-name product.
We assume f < (1   )qB such that qB > qN : The lower bound f may represent the minimum
level of quality at which a product functions or appears to function properly. The unit production
cost of the counterfeit is normalized to zero. Because it is illegal to produce counterfeits, there are
some chances that the counterfeiter will be caught by the authorities. Suppose this occurs with
probability  2 (0; 1) which captures the monitoring e¤orts of the government and the brand-name
company on counterfeit production. In that case, the counterfeiter cannot sell his goods to the
market, while getting his investment conscated and paying a ne hN . With probability (1   ),
the game proceeds to stage 2 in which the non-deceptive counterfeiter decides his wholesale price
wN to the illicit distributor. For simplicity, we represent all distributors/retailers in the illicit sup-
ply chain as one illicit distributor. In stage 3, the illicit distributor decides the retail price of the
non-deceptive counterfeit to consumers, pN . The illicit distributor has to pay a penalty of lN if
getting caught by the authorities with probability N .
The deceptive counterfeiter (i = D) breaks into a licit supply chain by distributing his goods
through a licit distributor, who then sells both brand-name products and deceptive counterfeits to
consumers at the same price pB: In this case, consumers cannot distinguish deceptive counterfeits
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from brand-name products. Like the non-deceptive counterfeiter, in stage 1, the deceptive counter-
feiter determines his functional quality fD 2 [f; f ], while facing the risk of getting his investment
tf2D conscated and paying a ne hD. In stage 2, the deceptive counterfeiter decides his wholesale
price wD to the licit distributor. In stage 3, the licit distributor determines a proportion s 2 [0; 1]
of the deceptive counterfeit among all products he sells to consumers, and then sells all products at
the price pB. We focus on the interesting case when s > 0. We model the risk of the licit distributor
selling deceptive counterfeits with a likelihood D of getting caught and a penalty lD. Since D
tends to increase with more counterfeits in the market, we set D equal to the fraction of deceptive
counterfeits, s. In §7, we consider a more general case in which D is a function of fD as well as s.
We make the following assumptions to simplify our analysis. First, we assume that the retail
price of a brand-name product pB is exogenous to the licit distributor in a market with deceptive
counterfeits, and that the licit distributor earns a xed markup k 2 [0; 1) from selling the brand-
name product. This might be a result of the sales price maintenance that is employed in several
industries such as consumer electronics, luxury brands, franchise stores and some pharmaceutical
markets (e.g., Netessine and Zhang 2005). Without loss of generality, we normalize k = 0, implying
that the licit distributor does not make a prot from selling authentic products; whereas we later
show that the deceptive counterfeiter chooses a wholesale price wD in equilibrium that guarantees a
positive markup to the licit distributor. In online appendix, we also analyze the case where the licit
distributor decides the retail price endogenously, and show that our main results are directionally
true. Second, we normalize hN = 0 and lN = 0; while having hD = h > 0 and lD = l > 0:
In practice, many non-deceptive counterfeiters are small workshops, and illicit distributors are
usually street vendors or internet sites. Since their potential loss from seizure is small, when they
get caught, they tend to close their stores temporarily and then reopen the same stores or open
new ones later (e.g., Yatai Xinyang market in Shanghai, China (Naumann 2009)). In contrast,
punishment on deceptive counterfeiters and licit distributors tend to be very severe. For example,
the Chinese court sentenced the head of a manufacturing and distribution network for fake pills
to 17 years in prison (Bennett 2010) and the U.S. court sentenced the owner of McCleod Blood
and Cancer Center in Tennessee who imported illegal cancer drugs to serve 2 years and to pay
$2.6 million (Imber 2014). Third, for both types of counterfeits, we assume that the probability of
counterfeits getting conscated at the production level () is independent of that at the distribution
level (N or D). In the example of the Scotch whisky company, the locations of many counterfeit
production facilities were unknown even when the counterfeits ooded the market (Green and
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Smith 2002). The enforcement operations resulted in 56 arrests across nine Turkish cities in 2013
for producing counterfeit cancer drugs (Taylor 2014), which were conducted independently of the
arrest of a Turkish drug wholesaler who smuggled those drugs into the U.S. (Whalen 2014). Table
2 summarizes our notation.
Table 2. Summary of Key Notation
Symbol Denition
i Brand-name product (= B), non-deceptive counterfeit (= N); deceptive counterfeit (= D)
 Taste of consumers;   U [0; 1]
pi Retail price of product i to consumers
qi Real quality of product i
i Perceived quality of product i
fi Functional quality of counterfeit product i; fi 2 [f; f ]
i Expected prot from selling product i
wi Wholesale price of product i to a distributor
t Cost parameter used in the cost of developing functional quality
 Fraction of the quality of brand-name products that counterfeits steal;  2  0; 1  f=qB
 Probability that a counterfeiters investment will be conscated;  2 (0; 1)
l Fine to the licit distributor if getting caught for selling deceptive counterfeits; l > 0
h Fine to the deceptive counterfeiter if getting caught; h > 0
 Fraction of proactive consumers in the market;  2 [0; 1]
s Fraction of deceptive counterfeits among all products the licit distributor sells; s 2 [0; 1]
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we present our equilibrium analysis. In §4.1 we present equilibrium, denoted by
superscript , in a market with a non-deceptive counterfeiter. In §4.2 we present equilibrium,
denoted by superscript , in a market with a deceptive counterfeiter. All proofs are provided in
online appendix.
4.1 Non-Deceptive Counterfeits
In the market where non-deceptive counterfeits exist, there are three segments of consumers: (i)
consumers who value the quality of a product highly and purchase the brand-name product, (ii)
consumers who value the quality less and purchase the non-deceptive counterfeit, and (iii) consumers
who value the quality the least and do not purchase any product. By determining the consumer
who is indi¤erent between any two segments, we can obtain the market shares of the brand-name
product and the counterfeit (see online appendix for details). Using these market shares, denoted
by mi for i = B or N , we solve the game backwards to derive subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
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In stage 3, the illicit distributor determines the retail price pN by solving:
max
pN
(pN   wN )mN = (pN   wN )
n
pB pN
(1 )qB fN  
pN
fN+qB
o
:
One can easily obtain her optimal retail price pN (wN ; fN ) =
(qB+fN )pB+qBwN
2qB
: By anticipating the
best response of the illicit distributor, in stages 2 and 1, the non-deceptive counterfeiter determines
his wholesale price wN and functional quality fN , respectively, to maximize his expected prot:
N (wN ; fN ) = (1  )
n
wN

pB pN
(1 )qB fN  
pN
fN+qB

  tf2N
o
  tf2N :
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the non-deceptive counterfeiter chooses wholesale price wN =
pB(f

N+qB)
2qB
,
and functional quality fN = f if t <
(1 )p2B
8f(1 )qB fNg3 and 

N (f)  N (f), and otherwise fN
can be f or fN 2 (f; f) that satises @

N
@fN
jfN=fN = 0: The resulting expected prot is N =
p2B(1 )(fN+qB)
8qBf(1 )qB fNg   t(f

N )
2:
A key implication of Lemma 1 is that the non-deceptive counterfeiter may not always choose the
lowest quality in contrast to the common assumption used in the literature (e.g., Grossman and
Shapiro 1988a,b). In the past, non-deceptive counterfeits with low functional quality such as brand-
name costumes, footwear and accessories dominated a counterfeit market. Their functional quality
is just enough for consumers to use them, but their durability and performance are substandard.
Consumers who purchase such counterfeits are those who want to enjoy the snob appeal of brands,
but do not want to pay the high price of genuine goods. However, in todays counterfeit markets,
counterfeiters come in varying levels of quality depending on their intended markets. For example,
although most of counterfeit shoes in China are of low quality, there are high-end fakes designed
primarily for export, which are so sophisticated that it is di¢ cult to distinguish the real ones from
the counterfeits (Schmidle 2010). These counterfeiters usually face the least pressure from local
enforcement agencies and some are likely to turn into licit competitors once intellectual property
rights become more strictly enforced (Staake and Fleisch 2008). Our result is consistent with this
observation of todays counterfeit markets.
4.2 Deceptive Counterfeits
In the market where deceptive counterfeits exist, both brand-name products and deceptive coun-
terfeits are sold at price pB:While proactive consumers with proportion  perceive the quality of a
product in the market as (1  s)qB + sqD, the rest of consumers perceive the quality of a product
in the market as qB. Similar to Grossman and Shapiro (1988a), we assume that the expectation
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of proactive consumers about the fraction of deceptive counterfeits in the market is rational and
hence is equal, in equilibrium, to the actual fraction of counterfeits; i.e., s = s. These consumers
may build rational expectations through repeated interactions in the marketplace (especially when
they have been in the market with counterfeits for a long period of time) and through learning from
the media. This notion of rational expectations equilibrium is also used in the recent operations
management literature (e.g., Su and Zhang 2008, Cachon and Swinney 2009).
In this market, there are only two segments of consumers: (i) consumers who purchase products,
and (ii) consumers who do not purchase any product. Among those consumers who purchase
products, a fraction s of them receives deceptive counterfeits unknowingly. We solve the model
backwards as follows. In stage 3, the licit distributor solves the following problem to determine s:
max
s2[0;1]
(1  s)
h
s(pB   wD)
n
1  pB(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)  
(1 )pB
qB
oi
  sl;
where (1 s) represents the likelihood that the distributor will not be detected for selling counterfeits
and the next term in the bracket represents the distributors prot in that case. When there is a
seizure with probability s, the licit distributor does not sell any products (hence making no prots),
and pays a penalty l. In stages 2 and 1, the deceptive counterfeiter decides his wholesale price wD
and functional quality fD; respectively, to maximize his expected prot given by:
D(wD; fD) = (1  )
h
wDs

n
1  pB(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)  
(1 )pB
qB
o
  tf2D
i
  (tf2D + h):
Lemma 2 (a) When no consumers are proactive (i.e.,  = 0), in equilibrium, the deceptive coun-
terfeiter chooses wholesale price wD = pB  
r
lpB
1  pB
qB
and functional quality fN = f , getting the
expected prot of D =
1
2(1  )
r
pB

1  pBqB

 pl
2
  tf2   h.
(b) When proactive consumers exist (i.e.,  > 0), there exists t (> 0) such that if t  t; the de-
ceptive counterfeiter chooses fD = f; and otherwise f

D can be f or f

D 2 (f; f) that satises
@D
@fD
jfD=fD = 0: (In this case, no closed-form expressions exist for wD and D .)
In the market with no proactive consumers, Lemma 2(a) shows that the deceptive counterfeiter
always chooses the lowest functional quality f because improving quality does not increase coun-
terfeit sales. Although such a counterfeit is visually identical to its brand-name product, its low
quality may endanger consumershealth and safety. Typical examples are food, beverage, pharma-
ceuticals, and automotive spare parts (OECD 2008). It is also interesting to note that the deceptive
counterfeiters expected prot increases with pB

1  pBqB

; which is the revenue of the brand-name
13
company without counterfeits. This is because the perceived quality and price of the deceptive
counterfeit are the same as those of the brand-name product.
In the market where some consumers are proactive, although consumers cannot distinguish the
deceptive counterfeit from the brand-name product, the deceptive counterfeiter can still nd it
optimal to improve his functional quality fD above the minimum level f . The reason is as follows.
When fD is improved, both aggregate demand for brand-name and counterfeit products and the
fraction of deceptive counterfeits are increased. Thus the marginal benet of improving functional
quality is positive. If the marginal benet exceeds the marginal cost, then the deceptive counterfeiter
will choose his functional quality fD above f . In practice, some deceptive counterfeits reveal
di¤erent levels of functional quality; for example, some fake drugs have the right active ingredients
and they may even have the right amounts, while others may contain the wrong ingredients including
toxic compounds (Israel 2014).
Having analyzed the equilibrium decisions of counterfeiters and distributors in licit and illicit
supply chains, we next examine the e¤ectiveness of anti-counterfeiting strategies: quality and pric-
ing strategies in §5, and marketing, enforcement, and technology strategies in §6.
5 Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies: Quality and Price
We examine the e¤ectiveness of quality and pricing strategies against the non-deceptive counter-
feiter in §5.1, and against the deceptive counterfeiter in §5.2. Then we compare them in §5.3. In
each of §5.1 and §5.2, we proceed our analysis as follows. First, we examine whether the brand-
name company should choose higher/lower quality or price than the case with no counterfeiter in
order to maximize her expected prot against the counterfeiter. We analyze quality and pricing
strategies separately, while discussing the combined strategy towards the end of this section. In
practice, quality may not be changed in a short period of time because it often involves a change of
product design and specications, whereas price can usually be changed more easily. Thus, when
a counterfeit problem is urgent and requires immediate actions, the brand-name company may
adjust the price of her product to combat counterfeits. For example, Wertheimer et al. (2003)
propose reducing drug prices to make counterfeiting less protable. In other cases, the brand-name
company may not change her price due to the presence of counterfeits (Wee et al. 1995). For
example, when luxury brands reduce their prices, they may damage their prestige, so many luxury
brands rarely reduce prices (Bastien and Kapferer 2013). Instead, they improve the quality of their
products by adding more features to combat counterfeits (Poddar et al. 2012). Given price pB; let
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qmB denote the optimal quality of the brand-name product with no counterfeiter in the market, and
let qB (resp., q

B ) denote the optimal quality of the brand-name product in the presence of the non-
deceptive (resp., deceptive) counterfeiter. Similarly, given quality qB; let pmB denote the optimal
price of the brand-name product with no counterfeiter, and let pB (resp., p

B ) denote the optimal
price in the presence of the non-deceptive (resp., deceptive) counterfeiter. Second, knowing that
the strategies of choosing qB and p

B (resp., q

B and p

B ) instead of q
m
B and p
m
B improve the expected
prot of the brand-name company, we examine how these strategies a¤ect the expected prot of the
non-deceptive (resp., deceptive) counterfeiter. Finally, we investigate how those strategies a¤ect
expected consumer welfare, which is dened as follows.
When only brand-name products exist in the market, we can dene consumer welfare as CSB =R 1
pB
qB
(qB   pB)d. Similarly, we can dene CSN or CSD as consumer welfare in the market where
non-deceptive or deceptive counterfeits co-exist with brand-name products, respectively, as follows:
CSN =
R eb (qN   pN ) d + R 1e (qB   pB)d, where b = pNfN+qB and e = pB pN(1 )qB fN ;
CSD = s
R 1
 (qD   pB) d + (1  s)
R 1
 (qB   pB) d, where  = pB(1 s)qB+sqD +
(1 )pB
qB
:
The rst term of CSN represents the surplus of those consumers who purchase the non-deceptive
counterfeit, and the second term represents the surplus of those consumers who purchase the brand-
name product. The rst term of CSD represents the surplus of those consumers who are cheated
and receive the deceptive counterfeit, and the second term represents the surplus of those consumers
who purchase and receive the brand-name product. Considering the chances that counterfeits do
not reach the market due to seizure, we can further dene ECSN or ECSD as the expected consumer
welfare when the counterfeiter is non-deceptive or deceptive, respectively, as follows:
ECSN = (1  )CSN + CSB and ECSD = (1  )CSD + CSB:
Let ECSN or ECS

D denote the corresponding expected consumer welfare in equilibrium. We can
show that ECSD < CSB < ECS

N . Intuition from this result is as follows. When non-deceptive
counterfeits exist in the market, a consumer has a cheap alternative to the brand-name product. In
equilibrium, the non-deceptive counterfeiter sets his price and functional quality such that he o¤ers
a higher utility to those consumers who enjoy the brand value of the brand-name product but do not
appreciate its high quality or cannot a¤ord its high price. Therefore, non-deceptive counterfeits
improve consumer welfare. In contrast, when deceptive counterfeits exist, some consumers are
cheated to receive low-quality deceptive counterfeits, resulting in a welfare loss. Note that we
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do not consider the socio-economic e¤ects of counterfeiting on criminal activities, employment,
innovation, tax revenues, and so on. If taking into account these indirect or long-term e¤ects into
account, then non-deceptive counterfeits may also decrease consumer welfare.
5.1 Non-Deceptive Counterfeits
This subsection examines the brand-name companys strategies against the non-deceptive counter-
feiter. We rst examine the brand-name companys quality strategy to combat the non-deceptive
counterfeiter. In the following, we present the results for the case when the quality of the non-
deceptive counterfeit is either low (i.e., fN = f) or high (i.e., f

N = f), since the exposition of our
results is much simpler in this case, while presenting the results for the case when fN 2 (f; f) in
online appendix (which involve complex conditions for parts (a) and (c) of Proposition 1).
Proposition 1 Suppose the quality of the non-deceptive counterfeit is either low (i.e., fN = f) or
high (i.e., fN = f). Then:
(a) To combat the non-deceptive counterfeiter, the brand-name company should choose a higher
quality than that without counterfeits (i.e., qB > q
m
B ) if and only if  < 1 
n
qmB qN (qmB )
qmB
o2
.
(b) When the brand-name company chooses a higher (resp., lower) quality than that without coun-
terfeits, the non-deceptive counterfeiter obtains a lower (resp., higher) expected prot (N ).
(c) When the brand-name company chooses a higher (resp., lower) quality than that without coun-
terfeits, the expected consumer welfare (ECSN ) is higher (resp., lower) unless the non-deceptive
counterfeiter reduces his quality level from high to low.
We rst consider the case when the non-deceptive counterfeit draws an insignicant amount of
brand value from the brand-name product (i.e.,  < 1   fqmB   qN (qmB )g2=(qmB )2). In this case,
Proposition 1(a) shows that the brand-name company should set her product quality higher than
qmB to combat the non-deceptive counterfeiter. This strategy not only improves the expected prot
of the brand-name company, but also decreases the expected prot of the non-deceptive coun-
terfeiter (Proposition 1(b)). In this case, even though the improved quality of the brand-name
product also improves the quality of the non-deceptive counterfeit, the di¤erence in quality be-
tween two competing products becomes larger because the counterfeit steals only a small part of
the brand value. Consequently, the non-deceptive counterfeiter will lose its quality competition
against the brand-name company. This result may explain how the shoe manufacturers mentioned
in §1 successfully addressed their counterfeiting issues by improving the quality of their products.
Finally, Proposition 1(c) shows that, although this strategy improves the expected prot of the
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Figure 1: Expected consumer welfare as a function of the brand-name product quality when non-
deceptive counterfeits are present in the market
brand-name company and reduces the expected prot of the non-deceptive counterfeiter, it does
not always benet consumers. This is because this strategy can lead the non-deceptive counterfeiter
to lower his functional quality. In this case, consumers who purchase non-deceptive counterfeits
su¤er from lower functional quality, resulting a welfare loss. For example, Figure 1 illustrates that
the expected consumer welfare ECSN falls when the brand-name products quality qB is increased
from qmB = 10:73 to q

B = 10:79.
Next, we consider the case when the non-deceptive counterfeit draws a signicant amount of
brand value from the brand-name product (i.e.,  > 1   fqmB   qN (qmB )g2=(qmB )2). In this case,
Proposition 1(a) shows it is optimal for the brand-name company to lower her product quality
because the costly improvement of the brand-name product will benet the non-deceptive counter-
feiter signicantly. While this strategy improves the expected prot of the brand-name company,
it can help the non-deceptive counterfeiter earn higher expected prot inadvertently (Proposition
1(b)), and make consumers su¤er from poor quality (Proposition 1(c)). Therefore, in this case, the
brand-name company may not use this strategy to combat the non-deceptive counterfeiter.
The following proposition shows how the brand-name company can combat the non-deceptive
counterfeiter through her pricing strategy.
Proposition 2 (a) To combat the non-deceptive counterfeiter, the brand-name company should
choose a lower price than that without counterfeits (i.e., pB < p
m
B ) for all .
(b) When the brand-name company chooses a lower price than that without counterfeits, the non-
deceptive counterfeiter obtains a lower expected prot (N ).
(c) When the brand-name company chooses a lower price than that without counterfeits, the expected
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consumer welfare (ECSN ) is higher unless the non-deceptive counterfeiter reduces his quality level
from high (i.e., fN = f) to low (i.e., f

N = f) or
@fN
@pB
is su¢ ciently high for fN 2 (f; f):
In contrast to the quality strategy, Proposition 2(a) shows that for any , the brand-name company
should set her price lower than pmB to combat the non-deceptive counterfeiter. This is because a
lower price enables the brand-name company to compete better against non-deceptive counterfeits
which are cheap alternatives of brand-name products. This strategy helps the brand-name company
to gain more market share by inducing some consumers to switch from non-deceptive counterfeits to
brand-name goods. As a result, this strategy also reduces the expected prot of the non-deceptive
counterfeiter (Proposition 2(b)). We further nd that the larger  is, the faster the expected
prot of the non-deceptive counterfeiter will decrease. This is because the brand-name company
relies more on price to compete with the non-deceptive counterfeiter when the quality levels of two
products are not so distinguished due to the larger . However, similar to the quality strategy,
Proposition 2(c) shows that reducing price pB can hurt consumers by inducing the non-deceptive
counterfeiter to reduce his quality level. This strategy has been used in practice: for example, to
combat rampant DVD piracy in Russia (Arvedlung 2004).
5.2 Deceptive Counterfeits
This subsection examines the brand-name companys anti-counterfeiting strategies against the de-
ceptive counterfeiter. As we will show below, most e¤ects of these strategies are monotonic when
no proactive consumers exist in the market (i.e,  = 0), whereas all e¤ects of these strategies are
non-monotonic when proactive consumers exist in the market (i.e.,  > 0). Thus, we rst examine
the former case analytically to establish monotonic results, and then conduct a numerical study for
the latter case to show non-monotonicity. This approach will enable us to isolate the e¤ect of , and
to explore dominant e¤ects of anti-counterfeiting strategies when positive  creates non-monotonic
e¤ects. Note that the results under  = 0 also bear some practical relevance (asymptotically)
because only a small fraction of consumers may be proactive in developed countries; for example,
 = 0:04 in the U.S. in our survey results shown in Table 1.
Let us rst analyze the case when no consumers are proactive. The following proposition shows,
counter-intuitively, that by setting the quality level lower than that without counterfeits in the
market, the brand-name company can improve her expected prot, reduce the expected prot of
the deceptive counterfeiter, and even improve expected consumer welfare.
Proposition 3 Consider the market in which no consumers are proactive (i.e,  = 0).
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(a) To combat the deceptive counterfeiter, the brand-name company should choose a lower quality
than that without counterfeits (i.e., qB < q
m
B ):
(b) When the brand-name company chooses a lower quality than that without counterfeits, the
deceptive counterfeiter obtains a lower expected prot (D ).
(c) When the brand-name company chooses a lower quality than that without counterfeits, the
expected consumer welfare (ECSD ) is higher as long as the quality of deceptive counterfeits (q

D )
is su¢ ciently low.
Proposition 3(a) states that the brand-name company should choose a lower quality level to com-
bat the deceptive counterfeiter. Because consumers cannot distinguish deceptive counterfeits from
brand-name products, this strategy reduces the perceived quality of all products in the market,
and thus reduces the aggregate demand for both brand-name and counterfeit goods. However, the
reduced aggregate demand discourages the licit distributor from taking the risk of selling deceptive
counterfeits. The result stated in Proposition 3(a) shows that the latter (positive) e¤ect dominates
the former (negative) e¤ect, so this strategy improves the expected prot of the brand-name com-
pany. This result highlights the importance of modeling the incentive of the licit distributor in this
supply chain: Without the licit distributor, the positive e¤ect of this strategy would not exist and
therefore the result opposite to Proposition 3(a) would be obtained. Because this strategy reduces
both the aggregate demand and the proportion of deceptive counterfeits sold by the licit distribu-
tor, it will also reduce the expected prot of the deceptive counterfeiter (Proposition 3(b)). More
generally, even when consumers are proactive (i.e.,  > 0), we show in the proof that the expected
prot of the deceptive counterfeiter increases with the quality of the brand-name product because
the deceptive counterfeit gets a free ride on the brand name of the genuine product. Therefore, the
brand-name company should be aware of this adverse e¤ect when confronting a deceptive counter-
feiter. For example, as the market size of the Scotch whisky company mentioned in §1 grew from
180,000 cases to 380,000 cases, the counterfeiters substantially broadened their activities and took
42% sales (Green and Smith 2002). Similarly, in the pharmaceutical industry, high-demand drugs
have the most serious counterfeit problem (Bull World Health Organ 2010). Finally, contrary to our
rst intuition that lower quality will hurt consumers, Proposition 3(c) suggests that this strategy
can improve consumer welfare. To understand this result, note that there are two opposing e¤ects
of having lower quality of brand-name products on consumer welfare: Consumers su¤er from lower
quality and fewer consumers buy products, but at the same time fewer consumers are deceived to
buy low-quality counterfeits. Proposition 3(c) shows that when the quality of deceptive counterfeits
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is su¢ ciently low, the latter e¤ect outweighs the former e¤ect, beneting consumers.
We next examine the e¤ectiveness of the pricing strategy against the deceptive counterfeiter.
Proposition 4 Consider the market in which no consumers are proactive (i.e,  = 0).
(a) To combat the deceptive counterfeiter, the brand-name company should choose a higher price
than that without counterfeits (i.e., pB > p
m
B ):
(b) When the brand-name company chooses a higher price than that without counterfeits, the de-
ceptive counterfeiter can obtain a higher or lower expected prot (D ).
(c) When the brand-name company chooses a higher price than that without counterfeits, the ex-
pected consumer welfare (ECSD ) is higher as long as the quality of deceptive counterfeits (q

D ) is
su¢ ciently low.
With no proactive consumers in the market, Proposition 4(a) states that the brand-name company
should increase her price to improve her expected prot against the deceptive counterfeiter (due to
the reason similar to Proposition 3(a)). Unlike the quality strategy, however, this pricing strategy
has non-monotonic impact on the expected prot of the deceptive counterfeiter (Proposition 4(b)).
To understand this result, note that there are two e¤ects of raising her price pB : (i) it reduces
the aggregate demand for brand-name and counterfeit goods; and (ii) it increases the distributors
margin from selling deceptive counterfeits. Because of the latter e¤ect, the strategy of raising the
price does not always reduce the proportion of deceptive counterfeits the licit distributor sells, nor
does it always reduce the deceptive counterfeiters market share and his expected prot. Therefore,
in implementing this pricing strategy, one should carefully consider these two counterbalancing
e¤ects of raising/reducing price. In practice, we observe both instances of raising or reducing prices:
Wertheimer et al. (2003) propose reducing drug prices to make counterfeiting less attractive by
reducing the prot margins of fake drugs (i.e., opposite e¤ect of (ii)), and Russia plans to raise
vodka prices to put out of business makers of counterfeit alcohol (via e¤ect (i)) although it will
also a¤ect licit companies (Reuters 2012). Finally, Proposition 4(c) suggests that this strategy can
improve consumer welfare when the quality of deceptive counterfeits is su¢ ciently low. We can
interpret this result similarly to Proposition 3(c).
Next, we analyze the case in which proactive consumers exist in the market (i.e.,  > 0). As
we have mentioned earlier, this additional factor causes all the e¤ects of the anti-counterfeiting
strategies to become non-monotonic. Specically, the brand-name companys quality qB (resp.,
pB ), can be higher or lower than q
m
B without counterfeits (resp., p
m
B ); furthermore, the deceptive
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counterfeiters expected prot D and the expected consumer welfare ECS

D are non-monotonic
with a change of qB or pB. Because the closed-form expressions of s; wD and f

D do not exist
in this case, no simple conditions can be derived analytically for monotonic results (see remarks on
the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 in online appendix). For this reason, we conduct a numerical
study to compare the results under  = 0 with those under  > 0, and explore dominant e¤ects.
The numerical experiments are conducted with the following settings: for each of  = 0; 0:25 or 0:5,
we constructed 1024 scenarios using the following parameter values: t 2 f0:005; 0:01; 0:015; 0:02g,
 2 f0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4g,  2 f0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4g, l 2 f0:005; 0:01; 0:015; 0:02g, cB 2 f0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4g,
h = 0, f = 0:1 and f = (1   )qB   0:1: The parameters are chosen so that they cover various
possible scenarios. We present a summary of the results in Table 3, which reads as follows: for
example, when  = 0:5, qB < q
m
B was observed in 97.3% of 1024 scenarios, and choosing q

B reduced
D in 97.3% of 1024 scenarios and increased ECS

D in 5.3% as compared to choosing q
m
B .
Table 3. E¤ects of Quality and Pricing Strategies against Deceptive Counterfeits
E¤ects of Choosing qB vs. q
m
B E¤ects of Choosing p

B vs. p
m
B
qB < q
m
B 

D # ECSD " pB > pmB D # ECSD "
 = 0 1 1 0.032 1 0.097 0.016
 = 0:25 0.961 0.961 0.052 0.989 0.398 0.048
 = 0:5 0.973 0.973 0.053 0.984 0.454 0.039
From Table 3, we can observe the following:
(1) The results obtained under  = 0 continue to hold in most scenarios under  > 0. However,
in some scenarios, the brand-name company nds it optimal to set qB > q
m
B or p

B < p
m
B . We can
explain this result as follows. First, recall from our discussions above that setting lower quality
qB or higher price p

B reduces the aggregate demand for brand-name and counterfeit goods, and
that the reduced aggregate demand discourages the licit distributor from taking the risk of selling
counterfeits. Propositions 3(a) and 4(a) suggest that the latter (positive) e¤ect always dominates
the former (negative) e¤ect when  = 0: However, with proactive consumers in the market (i.e.,
 > 0), the deceptive counterfeiter may improve his functional quality fD in response to the
reduced demand (see Lemma 2). This additional factor makes the licit distributor more willing to
sell counterfeits, so that the positive e¤ect does not always dominate the negative e¤ect.
(2) In those scenarios where qB > q
m
B , the strategy of setting higher quality q

B will increase the
deceptive counterfeiters expected prot D by making counterfeits ourish more in the market.
This happens because the improved quality of the brand-name product results in an increase of
the aggregate demand of brand-name and counterfeit goods, which in turn incentivizes the licit
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distributor to procure more deceptive counterfeits. This may be the cause of the initial failure of
the Scotch whisky company which improved her quality to combat deceptive counterfeits (see §1).
Also, from the table, we conrm that the deceptive counterfeiters expected prot is non-monotonic
in price pB for any   0; which can be explained similarly to Proposition 4(b).
(3) The expected consumer welfare ECSD has increased in more scenarios in the market with
 > 0 than in the market with  = 0. Similar to our explanation given in (1) above, this is because
the counterfeiter may improve his functional quality fD with proactive consumers. In general, for
any  2 [0; 1]; we can show that if an anti-counterfeiting strategy improves the average product
quality in the market, then it improves the expected consumer welfare.
(4) Anti-counterfeiting strategies are not necessarily more e¤ective as more consumers are proactive.
We observe that the number of scenarios in which the deceptive counterfeiters expected prot is
decreased or the expected consumer welfare is increased is not necessarily monotonic in : For
example, a change from qmB to q

B decreases the expected prot in all scenarios when  = 0; in
96.1% when  = 0:25; and in 97.3% when  = 0:5: Similarly, we can show that more proactive
consumers in the market do not necessarily benet the brand-name company. The reason is as
follows. Proactive consumers purchase products only when their expected utility is non-negative,
considering the likelihood of receiving deceptive counterfeits unknowingly. As a result, with more
proactive consumers, a smaller number of consumers will purchase products. This reduced aggregate
demand for products discourages the licit distributor from taking the risk of selling deceptive
counterfeits. Thus, depending on which of the two e¤ects (i.e., reduced aggregate demand and
reduced proportion of counterfeits) dominates, the expected prot of the brand-name company as
well as her market share may increase or decrease with more proactive consumers.
5.3 Comparison
We now compare the e¤ect of each strategy against the non-deceptive counterfeiter with that against
the deceptive counterfeiter. Using the results presented in §5.1 and §5.2, we summarize in Table 4
whether the brand-name company should choose higher/lower quality or price than the case with no
counterfeiter in order to maximize her expected prot, and how such anti-counterfeiting strategies
a¤ect the expected prot of the counterfeiter and the expected consumer welfare. (If a dominant
e¤ect exists for a non-monotonic case, Table 4 reports only the dominant e¤ect.)
Table 4. E¤ects of Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies: Non-Deceptive vs. Deceptive
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Non-Deceptive Counterfeits Deceptive Counterfeits
Optimal Strategy N ECS

N Optimal Strategy 

D ECS

D
qB > q
m
B (low ) # " qB < qmB # " (low qD ) or # (high qD )
qB < q
m
B (high ) " #
pB < p
m
B # " pB > pmB l " (low qD ) or # (high qD )
From Table 4, we can draw the following insights:
(1) The optimal strategy of the brand-name company (that maximizes her expected prot) di¤ers
depending on whether she faces the non-deceptive or deceptive counterfeiter. For example, reducing
price is optimal against the non-deceptive counterfeiter, whereas raising price is optimal against
the deceptive counterfeiter.
(2) Even when the optimal strategy of the brand-name company is the same against both types of
counterfeiters, its impact on the counterfeiters expected prot and the expected consumer welfare
may not be the same. For example, when the non-deceptive counterfeit draws a signicant amount
of brand value (i.e., high ), setting a lower quality level than that without counterfeits improves
the brand-name companys expected prot against either type of the counterfeiter. This strategy
is e¤ective against the deceptive counterfeiter (i.e., reduces D ), but it does not work well against
the non-deceptive counterfeiter (i.e., increases N ). Moreover, its impact on the expected consumer
welfare may not be the same across the two types of counterfeiters, either.
(3) An ideal anti-counterfeiting strategy should improve the brand-name companys expected prot,
reduce the counterfeiters expected prot, and improve the expected consumer welfare. The pricing
strategy is such an ideal strategy against the non-deceptive counterfeiter. For the other cases, the
brand-name company or the government should carefully consider a trade-o¤ among those three
objectives in implementing an anti-counterfeiting strategy.
Lastly, we remark on two issues in the above analysis. First, our analyses so far have examined
whether the brand-name company should choose higher/lower quality or price for each type of a
counterfeiter. We show in online appendix that when the brand-name company can save large
costs of developing her product, the quality strategy is more protable than the price strategy
in combating either type of a counterfeiter. Second, although we have analyzed the quality and
pricing strategies separately, our results have implications for the anti-counterfeiting strategy that
combines both quality and pricing strategies. Consider a market with non-deceptive counterfeits
which steal a signicant amount of brand value (i.e., high ). In this case, the existence of non-
deceptive counterfeits yields lower optimal quality and price of the brand-name product than those
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in the monopoly case (see Propositions 1(a) and 2(a)). It is well-known that an optimal price of
a product in a monopoly market is increasing with the product quality. If we apply this result to
a market with non-deceptive counterfeits, the reduced quality of the brand-name product lowers
its optimal price even further than the optimal monopoly price. This implies that the brand-
name company should choose lower quality and lower price than the monopoly quality and price,
respectively. Next, consider a market with non-deceptive counterfeits in which  is low. In this case,
Propositions 1(a) and 2(a) have shown that the existence of non-deceptive counterfeits changes the
quality and price of the brand-name product in opposite directions. Because an optimal price of
a product in a monopoly market is increasing with the product quality, there is a counteracting
force that may a¤ect the price in the same direction as the quality. As a result, our numerical
study shows that the optimal quality and price can be higher or lower than the monopoly quality
and price, respectively. However, even when it is optimal for the brand-name company to set a
higher price than the monopoly price, she may not raise her price too high due to Proposition 2(a).
Likewise, in a market with deceptive counterfeits, where the existence of counterfeits changes the
quality and price of the brand-name product in opposite directions, a brand-name company may
increase or decrease quality and price simultaneously. Therefore, special care needs to be taken
when implementing the combined strategy.
6 Marketing, Enforcement, and Technology Strategies
In this section, we consider three other anti-counterfeiting strategies that are often used in prac-
tice. The rst strategy is the marketing campaign that educates consumers about the adversity
of counterfeit goods. For example, French luxury goods association Comite Colbert launched a
campaign (using playful slogans such as real ladies dont like fake) in response to the threat of
the counterfeit (Wellman 2012). This strategy helps reduce the brand value the counterfeit steals
from the brand-name product, i.e., reduce : The second strategy is the direct enforcement e¤ort
to increase the chances to seize counterfeit products, . For example, the French police raided
the clandestine workshops making Hermes counterfeit accessories, of which the surveillance was
part of an investigation into the international crime ring that robs many brands (Wellman 2012).
Lastly, the brand-name company may increase the technological complexity of her product to make
it more di¢ cult and expensive to counterfeit by increasing t. For example, the Scotch whisky com-
pany mentioned in §1 introduced a bottle with a special design so that the counterfeit cannot easily
imitate the original product (Green and Smith 2002). In the following, we examine how reducing
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 or increasing  or t will a¤ect rmsexpected prots and expected consumer welfare.
First, let us consider the market in which the brand-name company faces the non-deceptive
counterfeiter. It is intuitive that all three strategies will improve the expected prot of the brand-
name company and reduce the expected prot of the non-deceptive counterfeiter. However, we can
show that these strategies will hurt expected consumer welfare for the following reasons. The market
campaign makes those consumers who purchase non-deceptive counterfeits enjoy the counterfeit
brand less, resulting in a welfare loss. The enforcement strategy makes counterfeits less likely
to reach the market, so consumers will su¤er from less availability of non-deceptive counterfeits,
which are cheaper substitutes for brand-name goods. The technology strategy makes the non-
deceptive counterfeiter more reluctant to invest in quality improvement, and thus consumers will
su¤er from lower quality of the product. As an alternative strategy, the brand-name company may
consider introducing a low-price (and low-quality) variant of the product. For example, East African
Breweries launched a cut-price beer, called Senator Keg, to help reduce the demand for illicit
alcohol (The Economist 2010). This strategy may reduce the market share of the non-deceptive
counterfeit because price-sensitive consumers may nd such a low-price brand-name product a
better alternative to the counterfeit. At the same time, this strategy may increase consumer
welfare by introducing more competition into the market.
Next, we examine the e¤ectiveness of these anti-counterfeiting strategies against the deceptive
counterfeiter. The following proposition shows that the e¤ectiveness of each strategy di¤ers signi-
cantly from that against the non-deceptive counterfeiter. In online appendix, we further study how
di¤erent values of  a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of these strategies numerically.
Proposition 5 Consider the market in which deceptive counterfeits exist.
(a) (Marketing) When no consumers are proactive (i.e.,  = 0), reducing  has no impact on the
prots of the brand-name company (B ) and the deceptive counterfeiter (

D ), whereas it decreases
the expected consumer welfare (ECSD ). When some consumers are proactive (i.e.,  > 0), reducing
 decreases D , but it can increase or decrease 

B and ECS

D .
(b) (Enforcement) When  = 0, increasing  improves B , reduces 

D , and improves ECS

D .
When  > 0, increasing  reduces D , but it can increase or decrease 

B and ECS

D .
(c) (Technology) When  = 0, increasing t improves B , reduces 

D , and improves ECS

D : When
 > 0, increasing t reduces D , but it can increase or decrease 

B and ECS

D .
Proposition 5(a) suggests that special care must be taken when implementing the marketing cam-
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paign against the deceptive counterfeiter. For the case when no consumers are proactive, the
marketing campaign has no impact on the rmsexpected prots because consumers do not take
into account the possibility of receiving counterfeits unknowingly. This result is expected. On the
other hand, proactive consumers correctly expect that they will derive less utilities when receiv-
ing deceptive counterfeits unknowingly. Thus, when some consumers are proactive, the marketing
campaign can reduce the expected prot of the deceptive counterfeiter by discouraging proactive
consumers from purchasing products. However, it could backre the brand-name company because
proactive consumers reduce their consumption of brand-name products as well. Finally, unlike
the case when no consumers are proactive, this strategy could improve expected consumer welfare
when some consumers are proactive. The reason is as follows. As mentioned above, this strategy
may reduce the overall demand for the authentic good and its deceptive counterfeit. As a result,
although consumers enjoy the counterfeit less, fewer of them may receive low-quality deceptive
counterfeits. When the latter e¤ect outweighs the former e¤ect, this strategy benets consumers.
Proposition 5(b) shows that when no proactive consumers exist in the market, the enforcement
strategy works well against the deceptive counterfeiter. However, contrary to a common belief,
this strategy may reduce the expected prot of the brand-name company and also hurt expected
consumer welfare in the market where proactive consumers exist. This result can be explained as
follows. Similar to the impact of this strategy on the non-deceptive counterfeiter (discussed above),
by increasing the risk of counterfeiting, this strategy makes the deceptive counterfeiter reluctant
to invest in quality improvement. While the lower quality of non-deceptive counterfeits helps the
brand-name company regain its market share in quality competition, the lower quality of deceptive
counterfeits reduces the perceived quality of products in the market with proactive consumers,
hence reducing the aggregate demand for both brand-name goods and deceptive counterfeits. In
this case, consumers also su¤er from the lower quality of deceptive counterfeits although fewer
consumers will receive deceptive counterfeits unknowingly.
Proposition 5(c) shows that the technology strategy has the same impact as the enforcement
strategy. The reason is as follows. The enforcement strategy increases the expected loss of the
counterfeiter from a potential seizure. Similarly, if the brand-name product becomes more complex,
then it will be more costly for a counterfeiter to imitate the brand-name product, hence reducing his
expected prot from selling counterfeits. Therefore, both anti-counterfeiting strategies will reduce
the incentive of the counterfeiter to develop high-quality goods.
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7 Extension: Alternative Models for Counterfeiting Risks
In this section, we extend our base model to the case where the probability of counterfeits getting
conscated is a decreasing function of their functional quality. This is plausible in some situations
because those consumers who have su¤ered from the low quality of counterfeits can report them
to the authorities, which may lead to the raid of counterfeit factories or distributors. For example,
soon after the infusion of fake Avastin, a lung-cancer patient became nauseous and feverish (Whalen
2014). If fake Avastin had worked as well as its genuine one, it might have been di¢ cult to infer
that Avastin the patient received was counterfeit.
Specically, suppose that a counterfeiter will get caught by the authorities with the probability
of    1fi for i = N or D, and that a licit distributor will get caught with the probability of
s   2fD: We assume 1 > 0 and 2 > 0, so that the lower the quality of counterfeit goods, the
higher the detection probabilities become. We do not consider the case where the probability of
the illicit distributor getting caught for selling non-deceptive counterfeits is decreasing with the
quality of non-deceptive counterfeits. Such a case is unlikely in practice because consumers already
know what they purchase. Furthermore, this probability does not a¤ect our results due to our
assumption that the penalty to the illicit distributor lN = 0 (see §3).
We rst examine the counterfeiters quality decision. As in Lemma 1, the non-deceptive coun-
terfeiter chooses fN = f or f

N > f depending on the value of t and whether 

N (f)  N (f).
However, contrary to Lemma 2, the deceptive counterfeiter may choose fD > f even without
proactive consumers because high-quality counterfeits can induce the licit distributor to procure
more counterfeits by reducing his probability of getting caught. These results lead to the following
results regarding the e¤ectiveness of anti-counterfeiting strategies.
Corollary 1 Suppose the probability of a counterfeiter getting caught is    1fi for i = N or D,
and the probability of a licit distributor getting caught is s  2fD; where 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. Then:
(a) Proposition 1 continues to hold.
(b) Propositions 2, 3 and 4 continue to hold except that the conditions in part (c) are di¤erent.
(c) Proposition 5 continues to hold except that increasing  or t can increase or decrease the expected
prot of the brand-name company (B ) and the expected consumer welfare (ECS

D ) when no
consumers are proactive (i.e.,  = 0).
Corollary 1 shows that the general risk model in this section a¤ects only the impact of enforcement
and technology strategies (that increase  and t respectively) on the expected prot of the brand-
27
name company (B ) and the expected consumer welfare (ECS

D ) when combating the deceptive
counterfeiter. In the base model, Proposition 5 has shown that these strategies always improve B
and ECSD when no consumers are proactive. However, Corollary 1(c) shows that they can either
increase or decrease B and ECS

D even when no consumers are proactive. The intuition is as
follows. In the base model, when no consumers are proactive, the optimal functional quality fD
of the deceptive counterfeiter is always f . However, as we have discussed above, in the extended
model, fD > f is possible even when no consumers are proactive. In this case, as the investment for
quality improvement becomes more risky with higher  or t, the deceptive counterfeiter may nd
it optimal to reduce fD . This in turn increases the risk of the licit distributor selling counterfeits
(through 2fD) as well as his own risk of getting caught (through 1fD). As a result of these two
opposing e¤ects, we nd that increasing  or t can increase or decrease fD . When f

D is increased,
it will reduce the risk of the licit distributor selling deceptive counterfeits, hence increasing the
fraction of deceptive counterfeits; consequently, it could hurt the expected prot of the brand-name
company, B . On the other hand, when f

D is decreased, consumers will su¤er from the lower
quality of deceptive counterfeits; thus, it could reduce the expected consumer welfare ECSD :
Lastly, note that the probability of deceptive counterfeits getting conscated in our model does
not depend on the quality of the brand-name product. For example, for products such as milk,
gasoline and drug, consumers cannot verify active ingredients, so higher quality of a branded good
does not require a counterfeiter to spend more money in masquerading as branded products in
order to deceive consumers. However, in some cases (e.g., auto spare part), quality changes might
be related to the characteristics that consumers can identify when they make purchases. In such
cases, it may be plausible that the quality improvement of the brand-name product makes it more
di¢ cult for the deceptive counterfeiter to masquerade as the branded product. We may model this
by setting the conscation probability of a deceptive counterfeiter as    01(fD   fB) instead of
 1fD, and by setting the conscation probability of a licit distributor as s 02(fD fB) instead
of s  2fD, where fB is the functional quality of the brand-name product. In this case, if 01 or 
0
2
is su¢ ciently large, it is possible that the optimal quality of the brand-name product qB is higher
than qmB in the monopoly market; i.e., the brand-name company may improve the quality so as to
increase the probability of the deceptive counterfeit being detected.
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8 Concluding Remarks
Today counterfeit products are being produced and consumed in virtually all economies (OECD
2008). While easy-to-manufacture goods had dominated counterfeit supply until a decade ago, there
has been an alarming expansion of product categories being infringed. As a result of outsourcing
and o¤shoring, counterfeiters have easy access to modern technology and equipment, and they
are capable of producing high-quality replicas. Consumers are not easily deceived by fake goods
that are sold by vendors in open markets and unknown internet sites. These changing business
conditions require industry and governments to enhance their understanding of the current and
potential counterfeiters and to develop strategies to limit their activities.
To aid the e¤orts of industry and governments to combat counterfeiting, we have developed
a normative model of counterfeiting. Our model captures the recent changes in counterfeiting
supply and demand that are not addressed in the previous literature. For example, the previous
literature focuses on the pricing decision of a counterfeiter, assuming that the quality level of his
goods is xed, and he is capable of selling his goods, even deceptive ones, directly to consumers.
In contrast, our model takes into account the strategic decisions of a counterfeiter regarding his
price and functional quality; and the fundamental di¤erence between non-deceptive and deceptive
counterfeits in consumersawareness, distribution channels, and penalty on illegal production and
distribution. We have also considered the case when a fraction of consumers are proactive. Modeling
these factors explicitly enables us to evaluate several anti-counterfeiting strategies against both
types of counterfeiters, and to draw novel managerial insights.
Our analysis highlights that the strategies which are e¤ective in combating the non-deceptive
counterfeiter may not work well against the deceptive counterfeiter. Moreover, even if strategies
help the brand-name company improve her expected prot, they may not be e¤ective in limiting
counterfeit activities, and they can even hurt consumers. Specically;
- To combat the non-deceptive counterfeiter, the brand-name rm should improve her quality if
the non-deceptive counterfeit steals an insignicant amount of brand value, and reduce the product
price. The rm, governments and regulatory bodies can use marketing campaigns, enforcement
and technology strategies to reduce the counterfeiters prot, although these strategies may hurt
consumers.
- To combat the deceptive counterfeiter, the brand-name rm should lower her quality (unless high
brand-name quality facilitates the seizure of deceptive counterfeits signicantly), and may raise
the product price although this may benet the deceptive counterfeiter inadvertently. The rm,
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governments, and regulatory bodies can use marketing campaigns, enforcement and technology
strategies when there are few proactive consumers, but these strategies may hurt the brand-name
rm and consumers when a signicant portion of consumers is proactive.
In summary, industries and governments should understand the type of potential counterfeiters
and the characteristics of consumers in order to design e¤ective strategies to combat counterfeits.
Without such understanding, anti-counterfeiting strategies could be ine¤ective and hurt consumers.
There are several interesting future research avenues. First, it will be interesting to consider the
e¤ect of positive or negative externality of counterfeits on brand-name products. For some product
categories, counterfeits help to increase the size of user base of brand-name products, which refers to
positive externality. A typical example is software piracy (Conner and Rumelt 1991). The negative
externality of counterfeits refers to the negative impact of counterfeits on the value of a brand. More
counterfeits in the market, less prestigious the brand becomes. Second, consumers show risk-prone
or irrational behavior in some situations. For example, fraudsters use their phony pharmaceutical
websites to take advantage of the recent swine-u fears. Some consumers who are anxious for their
children take risks of buying fake vaccines and bogus remedies from unknown websites (Taylor 2009).
Behavioral research will help enrich our understanding of the risk attitudes of consumers. Third,
it will be interesting to conduct a detailed cost-benet analysis of anti-counterfeiting technologies
such as technologies to authenticate products (e.g., NanoInk) and technologies to track and trace
the movement of products (e.g., RFID). Our current model captures the role of these technologies to
some degree: the former type of technologies is captured by the technology strategy (i.e., with such
technologies installed, a counterfeiter needs to spend more e¤ort to copy authentic goods) and the
latter type of technologies is captured by the enforcement strategy (i.e., with RFID installed, the
likelihood of seizing counterfeits increases). Finally, it will be interesting to validate our ndings
empirically using industry data. For example, the patent for Viagra, one of the most popular
counterfeit drugs, has expired recently. As a result, many generic drugs have ooded the market,
causing a price drop. It will be interesting to test how such a price drop has a¤ected counterfeit
sales. In general, it may be challenging to collect accurate data about counterfeit sales due to the
illegal nature of counterfeit business. Thus, one may collect data in a market where intellectual
property rights are not strictly enforced or in an online market where data are easier to collect than
an o­ ine market.
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Online Appendix
Appendix A. Proofs of Analytical Results
We use (A1) and (A2) to indicate the following assumptions: (A1) qB > qN = fN + qB and
qB > qD = fD + qB; (A2) 1   pBqB > 0 and 1  
pB pN
qB qN > 0 so that mB > 0. We also use the
following denition of expected consumer welfare introduced earlier:
ECSN = (1  )CSN + CSB and ECSD = (1  )CSD + CSB: (1)
Proof of Lemma 1: We rst determine the market shares of the brand-name product and the
counterfeit, and then solve the model backwards. The consumer who is indi¤erent between pur-
chasing the brand-name product and the non-deceptive counterfeit has the taste e = pB pNqB qN =
pB pN
(1 )qB fN , which solves
eqN   pN = eqB   pB: Similarly, the consumer who is indi¤erent be-
tween purchasing the non-deceptive counterfeit and not purchasing any product has the tasteb = pNqN = pNfN+qB : Let m0 denote the proportion of consumers who do not purchase any product,
so that mB +mN +m0 = 1. Then:
mB = 1  e = 1  pB   pN
(1  )qB   fN and mN =
e   b = pB   pN
(1  )qB   fN  
pN
fN + qB
: (2)
In stage 3, the illicit distributor determines pN by solving:
max
pN
(pN   wN )mN = (pN   wN )

pB   pN
(1  )qB   fN  
pN
fN + qB

: (3)
By noting that the prot of the illicit distributor in (3) is concave in pN , one can easily obtain
pN (wN ; fN ) =
(qB+fN )pB+qBwN
2qB
:
In stage 2, the non-deceptive counterfeiter determines wN to maximize his expected prot given
by:
N (wN ; fN ) = (1  )

wN

pB   pN
(1  )qB   fN  
pN
fN + qB

  tf2N

  tf2N : (4)
Since N is concave in wN , we can easily obtain wN and 

N respectively as follows:
wN (fN ) =
pB(fN + qB)
2qB
and N (fN ) =
p2B(1  )(fN + qB)
8qB f(1  )qB   fNg   tf
2
N : (5)
In stage 1, the non-deceptive counterfeiter decides fN by solving max
fN2[f;f ]
N (fN ): From (5),
we obtain @
2N
@f2N
=
(1 )p2B
4f(1 )qB fNg3   2t; which is positive if t <
(1 )p2B
8f(1 )qB fNg3 . Thus, if t <
(1 )p2B
8f(1 )qB fg3 ; 

N is convex in fN 2 [f; f ], so fN = f when N (f)  N (f): Otherwise, fN
can be f or fN 2 (f; f) that satises @

N
@fN
jfN=fN = 0. A su¢ cient condition for fN > f is
t <
(1 )p2B
16ff(1 )qB fg2 ; which can be obtained from
@N
@fN
jfN=f = (1 )p
2
B
8f(1 )qB fg2   2tf > 0: 
Remark The initial investment tf2N is considered a sunk cost in (4). Our main results continue to
hold when the counterfeiters investment has residual value but gets conscated if getting caught.
Also, whether the conscation of investment occurs after stage 1 or stage 2 does not a¤ect the
counterfeiters decisions. If conscation occurs after some units are sold, (1  ) can be interpreted
as the fraction of sales the counterfeiter has generated before conscation.
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Proof of Lemma 2: Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can obtain the market shares of the
brand-name product and that of the deceptive counterfeit, respectively, as follows:
mB = (1  s)(1  ) and mD = s(1  ); (6)
where 1   1  pB(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB) 
(1 )pB
qB
represents the aggregate demand for both brand-name
and counterfeit products at price pB.
In stage 3, the licit distributor solves the following problem to determine s:
max
s2[0;1]
s(1  s)(pB   wD)

1  pB
(1  s)qB + s(fD + qB)  
(1  )pB
qB

  sl: (7)
From (7), we can show that the prot of the distributor is strictly decreasing in s for s 2 [12   ; 1];
where  is a small and positive constant. Moreover, the prot given in (7) is concave in s for s < 12 :
Thus, s is 0 or it satises the rst order condition in (0; 0:5).
In stage 2, the deceptive counterfeiter decides wD to maximize his expected prot given by:
D(wD; fD) = (1 )

wDs


1  pB
(1  s)qB + s(fD + qB)  
(1  )pB
qB

  tf2D

 (tf2D+h):
(8)
By noting that D is continuous in wD 2 [0; pB]; we know that the optimal wholesale price wD
always exists in [0; pB]: In the case when  > 0; the closed-form expressions for s and wD
do not exist. In the case when  = 0, we can obtain from the rst-order condition of (7) that
s(wD; fD) = 12   lqB2(pB wD)(qB pB) . By substituting s into (8) and solving maxwD2[0;pB ] D(wD; fD),
we obtain wD and 

D as follows:
wD (fD) = pB  
s
lpB
1  pBqB
and D (fD) =
1
2
(1  )
(s
pB

1  pB
qB

 
p
l
)2
  tf2D   h: (9)
In stage 1, the counterfeiter decides the functional quality fD by solving max
fD2[f;f ]
D (fD): When
 = 0; from (9), @

D
@fD
=  2tfD < 0; so fD = f . When  > 0; we next show that fD = f if t  t:
For any fD 2 (f; f ]; D (wD (fD); f)  D (wD (fD); fD) if t  (1  )wD (fD)fmD (wD (fD); fD) 
mD (w

D (fD); f)g(f2D   f2) 1: Suppose t  t  max
fD2(f;f ]
(1   )wD (fD)fmD (wD (fD); fD)   mD (
wD (fD); f)g(f2D f2) 1. Then, for any fD 2 (f; f ]; D (wD (f); f)  D (wD (fD); f)  D (wD (fD);
fD), where the rst inequality is due to the optimality of wD (f) given f; and the second inequality
follows from t  t: Therefore, fD = f:
In the rest of the proof, we show t > 0 in two steps: we rst show that s is increasing
in fD for given wD; and then show that the market share of the deceptive counterfeiter, mD =
s

1  (s)	 ; is increasing in fD for any given wD. Then from the denition of t, t > 0: Let
LD denote the expected prot of the licit distributor given in (7). Then
@LD
@s = (1  2s)(pB   wD)

1  	  s(1  s)(pB   wD)@@s   l; and
@2LD
@s@fD
= (2  3s)(pB   wD) pBsf(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)g2 + 2s(1  s)(pB   wD)
pBs(qB fD qB)
f(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)g3 ;
where the rst term is positive because we know from §4.2 that s < 0:5 and wD  pB; and the
second term is also positive according to (A1). Therefore, @LD@s is increasing in fD. Since s

satises @LD@s js=s = 0 due to the concavity of LD with respect to s, s is increasing in fD.
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Next, we show that mD increases as fD increases from fDL to fDH for given wD: Suppose this
does not hold. Then, LD satises the following:
LD(s
(fDH); fDH) = s(fDH)(1  s(fDH))(pB  wD)

1  (s(fDH); fDH)
	  s(fDH)l
 s(fDL)(1  s(fDH))(pB   wD)

1  (s(fDL); fDL)
	  s(fDH)l
< s(fDL)(1  s(fDH))(pB   wD)

1  (s(fDL); fDH)
	  s(fDH)l
< s(fDL)(1 s(fDL))(pB wD)

1  (s(fDL); fDH)
	 s(fDL)l = LD(s(fDL); fDH);
where the rst inequality follows from our premise, the second inequality follows from @

@fD
=
  pBsf(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)g2 < 0 for xed s, and the last inequality follows from
@s
@fD
> 0. However, this
contradicts the condition that s(fDH) maximizes the licit distributors prot LD given fDH .
Therefore, mD is increasing in fD for given wD; and t > 0.
A su¢ cient condition for fD > f is t < t  max
fD2(f;f ]
(1 )wD (f)fmD (wD (f); fD) mD (wD (f);
f)g(f2D   f2) 1: We show this by contradiction. Suppose fD = f and dene fmax = argmax
fD2(f;f ]
(1  
)wD (f)fmD (wD (f); fD) mD (wD (f); f)g(f2D f2) 1. Then D (wD (fmax); fmax)  D (wD (f);
fmax) > 

D (w

D (f); f); where the rst inequality is due to the optimality of w

D (fmax) given fmax,
and the second inequality follows from t < t. However, this contradicts our premise that fD = f .
Therefore, fD > f if t < t. 
Proof of Proposition 1: (a) The proof proceeds as follows: We rst obtain qmB and q

B, and
then derive the condition for qB > q
m
B . When there is no counterfeiter, the expected prot of the
brand-name company is given as follows:
mB = (pB   cB)

1  pB
qB

  tBq2B; (10)
where cB (> 0) is the marginal cost of the brand-name product. From (10),
@2mB
@q2B
=  2(pB cB)pB
q3B
 
2tB < 0; so we obtain qmB =
(pB cB)pB
2tBq
m2
B
from the rst order condition. When the non-deceptive
counterfeiter exists, we obtain B after substituting p

N and w

N into mB in (2) as follows:
B = (pB   cB)mB   tBq2B = (pB   cB)

1  (1  )pB
4f(1  )qB   fNg
  (3 + )pB
4qB

  tBq2B: (11)
From (11), when fN = f or f ,
@2B
@q2B
=  pB cB2 (pB(1 )(1 )
2
(qB qN )3 +
pB(3+)
q3B
)  2tB < 0 due to (A1). In
this case, from the rst order condition of (11), qB =
pB cB
2tB
n
(1 )(1 )pB
4f(1 )qB fN (qB)g2 +
(3+)pB
4q2B
o
:
We next show by contradiction that qB > q
m
B when  < 1   ( q
m
B qN (qmB )
qmB
)2: Suppose  <
1   ( qmB qN (qmB )qmB )
2 and qB  qmB : For fNH > fNL; from (5), we obtain @

N (fNH)
@qB
  @N (fNL)@qB =
( 1)p2B(fNH fNL)(1 )f(1 )qB (fNH+fNL)=2g
4f(1 )qB fNHg2f(1 )qB fNLg2 < 0 due to (A1); so f

N is decreasing in qB: Then q

B =
pB cB
2tB
n
(1 )(1 )pB
4f(1 )qB fN (qB)g2 +
(3+)pB
4q2B
o
 pB cB2tB f
(1 )(1 )pB
4f(1 )qmB fN (qmB )g2 +
(3+)pB
4qm2B
g > (pB cB)pB
2tBq
m2
B
= qmB ;
where the rst inequality follows from qB  qmB and fN (qB)  fN (qmB ); and the second inequality
follows from  < 1   ( qmB qN (qmB )qmB )
2: Thus, there is a contradiction, so qB > q
m
B when  < 1  
(
qmB qN (qmB )
qmB
)2. The case in which   1  ( qmB qN (qmB )qmB )
2 can be shown similarly.
(b) To establish the result in the proposition, it su¢ ces to show that N is decreasing in qB: The
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proof proceeds in two steps: We rst show that N decreases in qB for any given fN ; and then
show that this result holds even when fN changes with qB. First, from (5), we obtain
@N
@qB
=
(1 )p2Bfq2B( 1)+2qBfN ( 1)+f2Ng
4q2Bf(1 )qB fNg2
; which is negative by (A1) for any given fN . Next, we consider
the case in which fN changes from fN1 to fN2 when qB is increased from qBL to qBH . In this case,
N (fN1; qBL)  N (fN2; qBL) > N (fN2; qBH); where the rst inequality follows from fN (qBL) =
fN1 and the second inequality is due to
@N
@qB
< 0 8fN .
(c) We rst prove that ECSN is increasing in qB for given fN ; and then prove that ECS

N decreases
when fN is decreased from fNH to fNL for any given qB.
To prove that ECSN is increasing in qB; it su¢ ces to show that
@CSN
@qB
> 0 for any given fN
because @CSB@qB > 0 from the denition of CSB. Now suppose that qB is increased from qBL to
qBH . Then qN is also increased from qNL to qNH given fN ; b is decreased from bL to bH ; ande is decreased from eL to eH . Using pN = 3pBqN4qB , we can rewrite CSN and nd CSN (qBH) >R eHbL    3pB4qBH  qNHd + R 1eH (qBH   pB)d > R eHbL    3pB4qBH  qNHd + R eLeH    3pB4qBH  qNHd +R 1eL(qBH pB)d > CSN (qBL): The rst inequality holds because bL > bH and    3pB4qBH  qNH >
0 for  2 (bH ;bL): The second inequality holds because qBH   pB > qNH   pN for  2 (eH ;eL).
The third inequality follows from the fact that qBH > qBL and qNH > qNL:
Next, suppose fN is decreased from fNH to fNL for xed qB: Then b remains the same, wherease is decreased from e0  pB4f(1 )qB fNHg + 3pB4qB to e00  pB4f(1 )qB fNLg + 3pB4qB . Then,
ECSN (fNH) = (1  )
R e0b    3pB4qB  (fNH + qB)d + R 1e0(qB   pB)d+  R 1pBqB (qB   pB)d
> (1  )
R e00b    3pB4qB  (fNL + qB)d + R 1e00(qB   pB)d+  R 1pBqB (qB   pB)d = ECSN (fNL):
In the above, the rst inequality holds because

   3pB4qB

(fNH + qB) > qB   pB for  2 (e00;e0),
and the second inequality follows from fNH > fNL: 
Remark When fN 2 (f; f); assuming @
2fN
@q2B
 0; we can still obtain @2B
@q2B
< 0: From the rst order
condition of (11), qB =
pB cB
2tB
f (1 )(1  @fN=@qB)pB
4f(1 )qB fN (qB)g2 +
(3+)pB
4q2B
g: The condition for qB > qmB then
becomes (1 )(1  @f

N=@qB)
4f(1 )qB fN (qB)g2 +
3+
4q2B
  1
qm2B
> 0: Unfortunately, this condition cannot be simplied
further to the form like  < 1   ( qmB qN (qmB )qmB )
2 because the closed-form expressions for fN and
@fN
@qB
are not available. The proof for (b) does not require fN = f or f; so it also holds for
fN 2 (f; f). For (c), suppose qB > qmB . From (1), @ECS

N
@qB
= [q2B(1   )f16(1   )q2B + p2B((15 +
)  16)g+ fNfp2B(15+)  16q2Bgf2(1 )qB   fNg+ p2Bq2B(1 )@fN=@qB] f(1  )qB   fNg 2 :
Then ECSN is decreasing in qB 2 [qmB ; qB] so that ECSN is lower at qB than at qmB if @f

N
@qB
<
  q2B(1 )f16(1 )q2B+p2B((15+) 16)g+fNfp2B(15+) 16q2Bgf2(1 )qB fNg
p2Bq
2
B(1 )f(1 )qB fNg2
:
Proof of Proposition 2: (a) From (10), @
2mB
@p2B
=   2qB < 0; so we obtain pmB =
qB+cB
2 from the rst
order condition. Next, consider the market in which the non-deceptive counterfeiter exists. When
fN = f or f , from (11),
@2B
@p2B
=   1 2(qB qN )  
3+
2qB
< 0 and pB =
qBq

D(1 )
2( 4qB+3qD+qD) +
qB+cB
2 ; in this
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case, pB < p
m
B due to (A1). When f

N 2 (f; f); we show @

B
@pB
j
pB=
qB+cB
2
< 0, which then results in
pB < p
m
B . From (11), we obtain
@B
@pB
j
pB=
qB+cB
2
=
(1 )f4f2N +4(2 1)fN qB+4( 1)q2B+(cB qB)(cB+qB)@fN=@pBg
16f(1 )qB fNg2
;
which is negative because: 4f2N   4(1   2)fNqB   4(1   )q2B   @f

N
@pB
(qB   cB)(qB + cB) <
4f2N   4(fN   qB)fN   4fNqB   @f

N
@pB
(qB   cB)(qB + cB) =  @f

N
@pB
(qB   cB)(qB + cB)  0; where
the rst inequality is due to (A1) and the second inequality is due to @f

N
@pB
 0 and qB > pB  cB.
(b) The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1(b), and is hence omitted.
(c) The proof for the case in which fN = f or f is similar to that of Proposition 1(c). When f

N 2
(f; f); from (1), @ECS

N
@pB
= [ 2 f(1  )qB   fNg f16(1 )q2B+pBqB((15+) 16)+(pB(15+) 
16qB)f

Ng+p2BqB(1 )@fN=@pB] f(1  )qB   fNg 2 :Dene  = max
pB2[pB ;pmB ]
2 f(1  )qB   fNg f16(1 
)q2B + pBqB((15+ )  16)+ (pB(15+ )  16qB)fNgp 2B q 1B (1  ) 1 f(1  )qB   fNg 2 : Then
ECSN is increasing in pB 2 [pB; pmB ] so that ECSN is lower at pB than at pmB if @f

N
@pB
> : 
Proof of Proposition 3: (a) When  = 0, we obtain B after substituting s
 and wD into mB
in (6) as follows:
B = (pB cB)mB tBq2B = (pB cB)
24(1  )
8<:12(1  pBqB ) + 12
s
l(1  pBqB )
pB
9=;+ (1  pBqB )
35 tBq2B:
(12)
From (12), @
2B
@q2B
= (pB   cB)f pB(1+)q3B  
(4qB 3pB)(1 )
8(qB pB)q3B
q
lqBpB
qB pB g   2tB < 0 due to (A2), and
qB =
pB cB
2tB
n
(1  )( pB
2q2B
+ 1
4q2B
q
lpBq

B
qB  pB ) +
pB
q2B
o
from the rst order condition. By the same
procedure in the proof of Proposition 1(a), we can prove by contradiction that qB < q
m
B if and only
if l < 4pB(1  pBqmB ): Since s
 = 12   12
r
l
pB(1  pBqB )
> 0; we nd that l < pB(1  pBqmB ) < 4pB(1 
pB
qmB
),
so we always have qB < q
m
B :
(b) To establish the result in the proposition, it su¢ ces to show that D is increasing in qB:When
 = 0; it is easy to see @

D
@qB
=
@D
@(1  pB
qB
)
pB
q2B
> 0 8fD from (9). Since fD =f 8qB, the result follows.
(c) When  = 0; from (1), @ECS

D
@qB
=  (1 )
n
p2B
q3B
s + 12

1  p2B
q2B

@s
@qB
o
(qB   qD )+12

1  p2B
q2B

f1 
(1  )sg: Using @s@qB > 0 and (A2), we prove
@ECSD
@qB
< 0 when qD < qB   (1 p
2
Bq
 2
B )f1 (1 )sg
2(1 )
fp2B
q3B
s + 12

1  p2B
q2B

@s
@qB
g 1 for qB 2 [qB ; qmB ]. 
Remark When  > 0; both qB < q
m
B and q

B > q
m
B are possible as shown in Table 3. The condition
for qB < q
m
B is tB >
(pB cB)
2qmB
[pB
qm2B
  (1  )f1  (1 )pBqmB  
pB
(1 s(qmB ))qmB+s(qmB )(qmB+fD (qmB ))g
@s
@qB
+
(1   )(1   s(qmB ))f (1 )pBqm2B + pB(1 + s
(qmB )(   1 + @f

D
@qB
) + (fD (q
m
B ) + q
m
B   qmB )@s

@qB
)((1  
s(qmB ))q
m
B + s
(qmB )(q
m
B + f

D (q
m
B )))
 2g]; which can be obtained from @B@qB jqB=qmB < 0: In this
case, D is increasing in qB as in the case when  = 0 shown in the proof of Proposition 3(b). The
proof follows the same procedure as in that of Lemma 2, so we provide a sketch of the proof here.
For given wD and fD; we can show that s andmD are increasing in qB. Then when qB is increased
from qBL to qBH ; the following inequalities hold in equilibrium: D (w

D (qBH); f

D (qBH); qBH) 
D (w

D (qBL); f

D (qBL); qBH) > 

D (w

D (qBL); f

D (qBL); qBL): Finally, when  > 0; the condition
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for @ECS

D
@qB
< 0 given in the proof of Proposition 3(c) is modied to the following: qD f2s @@qB+
(1 2)@s@qB g <

1 

1  p2B
q2B

+2

pB   qB(1  s)
	
@
@qB
+(1 2)
n
1 

1     @fD@qB

s   qB @s@qB
o
:
Unfortunately, this condition cannot be simplied further since the closed-form expressions of
s and fD do not exist. The non-monotonicity of ECS

D is shown in Table 3.
Proof of Proposition 4: (a) From (12), @
2B
@p2B
=  1+qB  
1 
2p2B
q
lqB
(qB pB)pB
n
cB +
qB(pB cB)
4(qB pB)
o
< 0;
and @

B
@pB
j
pB=
qB+cB
2
= cB(1 )2(cB+qB)
q
l(qB cB)
qB(cB+qB)
> 0 due to qB > pB  cB by (A2). Therefore, by the
concavity of B , p

B > p
m
B :
(b) The non-monotonicity of D with respect to pB is shown in Table 3.
(c) When  = 0; from (1), @ECS

D
@pB
= (1 )[ spBqB

1  qDqB

+

1  pBqB

f12

1 + pBqB

@s
@pB
(qD  qB) 
1g] + (pBqB   1): Using @s

@pB
< 0 and (A2), we prove @ECS

D
@pB
> 0 when qD < qB   qB pB1  fpBqB s  
1
2

1 + pBqB

(qB   pB) @s@pB g 1 for pB 2 [pmB ; pB ]: 
Remark When  > 0; both pB > p
m
B and p

B < p
m
B are possible as shown in Table 3.
The condition for pB > p
m
B is (1   p
m
B
qB
) + (1   )(1   s(pmB ))Y + (pB   cB)[  qB   (1  
)Y @s

@pB
+ (1   )(1   s(pmB ))fY 1pmB +
pmB fs(pmB )
@fD
@pB
+(fD (p
m
B )+qB qB) @s

@pB
g
f(1 s(pmB ))qB+s(pmB )(qB+fD (pmB ))g2 g] > 0; where Y =
1   (1 )pmBqB  
pmB
(1 s(pmB ))qB+s(pmB )(qB+fD (pmB )) : This can be obtained from
@B
@pB
jpB=pmB > 0: The
condition for @ECS

D
@pB
> 0 given in the proof of Proposition 4(c) is modied to the following:
qD
n
s @@pB   1 
2
2
@s
@pB
o
< 1 

pB
qB
  1

+

pB   qB(1  s)
	
@
@pB
+ 1 
2
2
n
s @q

D
@pB
  qB @s@pB
o
 
1 + : Unfortunately, this condition cannot be simplied further since the closed-form expressions
of s and fD do not exist. The non-monotonicity of ECS

D is established in Table 3.
Proof of Proposition 5: When  = 0, we observe from (12) that B does not change with ;
and that B is increasing in  and t. When  > 0; similar to the proof of Lemma 2, we can
show that the aggregate demand, (1 ); for the brand-name product and the deceptive counterfeit
is increasing in  and decreasing in  and t; and that the fraction of the brand-name product,
(1  s); is decreasing in  and increasing in  and t. The non-monotonicity of B is shown in our
numerical experiments presented in online appendix B. The proofs for D and ECS

D are similar
to those of Proposition 3(b)-(c), and hence are omitted. 
Proof of Corollary 1: When the non-deceptive counterfeiter exists in the market, it is easy to see
that the price decisions of the illicit distributor and the counterfeiter in stages 3 and 2, respectively,
are unchanged. In stage 1, the counterfeiter chooses his optimal functional quality fN to maximize
his expected prot, which is modied from (5) as follows: N (fN ) =
p2B(1 +1fN )(fN+qB)
8qBf(1 )qB fNg   tf2N :
Similar to Lemma 1, we can show that fN = f , f or f

N 2 (f; f) that satises @

N
@fN
jfN=fN = 0;
depending on the value of t and whether N (f)  N (f). When the deceptive counterfeiter exists
in the market, in stage 3, the licit distributor chooses its optimal fraction s of counterfeits by
solving the following problem (which is modied from (7)):
max
s2[0;1]
sf1  s+ 2fDg(pB   wD)

1  pB
(1  s)qB + sqD  
(1  )pB
qB

  (s  2fD)l: (13)
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In stages 2 and 1, the counterfeiter decides wD and fD, respectively, to maximize his expected
prot given by: D(wD; fD) = wDs(1  + 1fD)
n
1  pB(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)  
(1 )pB
qB
o
  tf2D  
h: When  = 0; by following the procedure similar to that in the base model, we obtain the
closed-form expressions of s and w as follows: s = 1+2fD2   lqB2(pB wD)(qB pB) and wD =
pB  
r
lpB
(1  pB
qB
)(1+2fD)
: When  > 0; similar to the base model, we can show the existence of s,
w and fD ; but their closed-form expressions are not available.
(a) Suppose fN = f or f: We can obtain
@B
@qB
by replacing  in the base model with    1fN : To
show that Proposition 1(a) continues to hold, we need to prove that fN is decreasing in qB:For
fNH > fNL;
@N (fNH)
@qB
  @N (fNL)@qB can be expressed as follows:
 p2B(1 +1fNH)fqB(qB+fNH)(1 )+fNH(qB qB fNH)g
8q2Bf(1 )qB fNHg2
+
p2B(1 +1fNL)fqB(qB+fNL)(1 )+fNL(qB qB fNL)g
8q2Bf(1 )qB fNLg2
< (1 +1fNH)
h
 p2BfqB(qB+fNH)(1 )+fNH(qB qB fNH)g
8q2Bf(1 )qB fNHg2
+
p2BfqB(qB+fNL)(1 )+fNL(qB qB fNL)g
8q2Bf(1 )qB fNLg2
i
=   (1 +1fNH)p2B(fNH fNL)(1 )f(1 )qB (fNH+fNL)=2g
4f(1 )qB fNHg2f(1 )qB fNLg2 ;
which is negative due to (A1). Then, following the same procedure as in the proof of Proposition
1(a), we can show qB > q
m
B if and only if  < 1 
n
qmB qN (qmB )
qmB
o2
: For Proposition 1(b), when fN is
given, @

N
@qB
=
(1 +1fN )p2Bfq2B( 1)+2qBfN ( 1)+f2Ng
4q2Bf(1 )qB fNg2
< 0 due to (A1). When fN changes from fN1
to fN2 as qB is increased from qBL to qBH , N (fN1; qBL)  N (fN2; qBL) > N (fN2; qBH); where
the rst inequality follows from fN (qBL) = fN1 and the second inequality is due to
@N
@qB
< 0 8fN .
For Proposition 1(c), to prove that ECSN is increasing in qB; it su¢ ces to show that
@CSN
@qB
> 0:
Since @CSN@qB does not depend on  when fN is given, Proposition 1(c) continues to hold.
(b) We can show that the proof for Proposition 2 also applies to the case with  1fN similarly to
Proposition 1, except part (c) when fN 2 (f; f):With the extension, @ECS

N
@pB
= f(1  )qB   fNg 2
[p2B
@fN
@pB
f 1fN (2qB 2qB+fN ) qB(( 1)1qB+ 1)g 2(( 1)qB+fN )ffNpB(1qB  
15+ 1f

N +
16qB
pB
)+ qB(16( 1)qB pB(+15)+16pB)g]: Dene  = max
pB2[pB ;pmB ]
2p 2B (( 1)qB+
fN )ffNpB(1qB  15+ 1fN + 16qBpB )+ qB(16( 1)qB pB(+15)+16pB)gf 1fN (2qB 
2qB+f

N ) qB(( 1)1qB+ 1)g 1: Then ECSN is increasing in pB 2 [pB; pmB ] so that ECSN
is lower at pB than at p
m
B if
@fN
@pB
> :
To show that Proposition 3(a) continues to hold, when  = 0; we can prove by contradiction that
qB < q
m
B if and only if (1+2fD)l < 4pB(1  pBqmB ) by the same procedure as in the proof of Proposition
1(a). Since s = 1+2fD2   12
r
l(1+2fD)
pB(1  pBqB )
> 0; we obtain l < pB(1  pBqmB )(1+2fD) <
4pB
1+2fD
(1  pBqmB ); so
qB < q
m
B always holds. For Proposition 4(a),
@B
@pB
j
pB=
qB+cB
2
= cB(1 +1fD)2(cB+qB)
q
l(qB cB)(1+2fD)
qB(cB+qB)
> 0,
so pB > p
m
B . For Propositions 3(b) and 4(b), we can show that, with the extension, s
 and
mD are increasing in qB and decreasing in pB for given wD and fD. Then, when qB is increased
from qBL to qBH ; the following inequalities hold in equilibrium: D (w

D (qBH); f

D (qBH); qBH) 
D (w

D (qBL); f

D (qBL); qBH) > 

D (w

D (qBL); f

D (qBL); qBL): Similarly, when pB is decreased from
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pBH to pBL; the following inequalities hold in equilibrium: D (w

D (pBL); f

D (pBL); pBL) 
D (w

D (pBH); f

D (pBH); pBL) > 

D (w

D (pBH); f

D (pBH); pBH). Propositions 3(c) and 4(c) can be
shown similarly to Proposition 2(c).
(c) The proofs of D and ECS

D are similar to those of Proposition 3(b)-(c). When  = 0; the
non-monotonicity of B or ECS

D with respect to  can be shown numerically as follows. Set
qB = 1; pB = 0:5; t = 0:01; cB = 0:01;  = 0:1; l = 0:02; h = 0 and 1 = 2 = 0:1: As  increases
from 0:2 to 0:3, B increases from 0:174 to 0:181 and ECS

D increases from 0:070 to 0:076: As 
increases from 0:3 to 0:4; B decreases from 0:181 to 0:173 and ECS

D decreases from 0:070 to
0:069: The non-monotonicity of B or ECS

D with respect to t can be shown similarly. 
The following corollary examines when the quality strategy is more protable than the pricing
strategy for the brand-name company.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the brand-name company needs to invest tBq2B for developing and setting
up facilities to produce a product with quality qB. Then:
(a) Consider the market in which a non-deceptive counterfeit with fN = f or f exists. There
exists tN such that if tB > tN and   1  
n
qmB qN (qmB )
qmB
o2
; the brand-name company is more
protable when setting quality qB (< q
m
B ) than setting price p

B (< p
m
B ); and if tB > tN and
 < 1 
n
qmB qN (qmB )
qmB
o2
; the brand-name company is less protable when setting quality qB (> q
m
B )
than setting price pB (< p
m
B ).
(b) Consider the market in which a deceptive counterfeit exists and there are no proactive consumers
with  = 0. There exists tD such that if tB > tD; the brand-name company is more protable when
setting quality qB (< q
m
B ) than setting price p

B (> p
m
B ).
Proof of Corollary 2: (a) When non-deceptive counterfeits are in the market and   1  n
qmB qN (qmB )
qmB
o2
; we know from Propositions 1 and 2 that qmB > q

B and p
m
B < p

B: To determine
which strategy is more protable, we compare  @B@qB and
@B
@pB
: For given qB and pB; from (11),
@B
@pB
 
( @B@qB ) = 1 
(3+)pB
4qB
  (1 )pB4(qB qB fN ) 
(pB cB)f4qB (3+)(fN+qB)g
4qB(qB qB fN )  
pB(pB cB)
4
n
3+
q2B
+ (1 )(1 )
(qB qB fN )2
o
 
2qBtB; which is decreasing in tB: Thus, if tB is su¢ ciently large,
@B
@pB
< ( @B@qB ) so that chang-
ing quality from qmB to q

B is more protable than changing price from p
m
B to p

B: The proofs for
 < 1 
n
qmB qN (qmB )
qmB
o2
and for (b) are similar to that for (a), and are hence omitted. 
Appendix B. Numerical Experiments
This section contains our numerical study that examines the e¤ectiveness of the marketing cam-
paign, the enforcement strategy and the technology strategy against the deceptive counterfeiter.
Similar to the numerical study presented in §5.2, we have constructed 1024 scenarios for  = 0; 0:25
or 0:5; using the following parameter values: t 2 f0:005; 0:01; 0:015; 0:02g,  2 f0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4g,
 2 f0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4g, l 2 f0:005; 0:01; 0:015; 0:02g, cB 2 f0:005; 0:01; 0:015; 0:02g, h = 0, f = 0:1
and f = (1  )qB   0:01: (qB; pB) is xed at (qmB ; pmB ). We omit the result for increasing t because
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its e¤ect is essentially the same as increasing . We computed the di¤erence in rmsexpected
prots and expected consumer welfare associated with the adjacent values of  or  for a xed set
of other parameter values. There are 3 increments of  or  for a set of 256 possible values of other
parameters, so there are 768 scenarios for which we can examine the direction of changes with a
decrease of  or an increase of . The results are summarized in Table 5, which reads as follows:
for example, when  = 0:5; reducing  increased B in 33.1% of 768 scenarios, decreased 

D in all
scenarios, and increased ECSD in 13.9% of 768 scenarios.
Table 5. E¤ects of Marketing and Enforcement Strategies against Deceptive Counterfeits
E¤ects of Reducing  E¤ects of Increasing 
B " D # ECSD " B " D # ECSD "
 = 0 no change no change 0 1 1 1
 = 0:25 0.374 1 0.260 1 1 0.952
 = 0:5 0.331 1 0.139 0.990 1 0.927
Table 5 conrms the results stated in Proposition 5. In addition, similar to the quality and pricing
strategies discussed in §5.2, these strategies are not necessarily more e¤ective as more consumers
are proactive with higher .
Appendix C. Extension: Price Decision of Licit Distributor
When the deceptive counterfeiter is in the market, suppose that the licit distributor decides on
the retail price pB, while the brand-name company instead decides the wholesale price wB to
the licit distributor. The rest of the decisions remain the same as in the base model as follows.
After observing the quality qB and wholesale price wB of the brand-name product, the deceptive
counterfeiter decides his functional quality fD and wholesale price wD in stages 1 and 2, respectively.
In stage 3, the licit distributor decides a fraction of deceptive counterfeits s; and then decides the
retail price pB. We consider two cases that di¤er in how the licit distributor determines pB: (1) the
distributor chooses the retail price that maximizes his expected prot from selling both brand-name
and counterfeit goods; and (2) the distributor chooses the optimal retail price as if he does not
sell the deceptive counterfeit, for fear that consumers or third parties may identify the deceptive
counterfeit from a lower retail price than the price of authentic goods. The second case reects the
fact that a deceptive counterfeit is usually sold at the same price or close to that of its branded
product so as to deceive consumers (see §1 and §3).
In the rst case, the licit distributor solves the following problem in stage 3 to determine pB:
max
pB
(1  s) fpB   swD   (1  s)wBg
n
1  pB(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)  
(1 )pB
qB
o
  sl:
We can verify that the distributor prot is concave in pB; and obtain pB =
swD+(1 s)wB
2 +
1
2f (1 s)qB+s(fD+qB) +
1 
qB
g 1. Since wD < wB and fD + qB < qB; the distributor charges a
lower retail price pB when the fraction of counterfeits s is larger or the fraction of proactive con-
sumers  is larger. To nd the optimal fraction s, the licit distributor solves the following problem
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which is obtained by substituting pB into the distributors prot:
max
s
1
4(1 s)
n

(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB) +
1 
qB
o
swD + (1  s)wB  
n

(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB) +
1 
qB
o 12 sl:
Due to complexity, however, it is not possible to nd the closed-form expression of s. Although the
part of our analysis in the base model does not rely on its closed-form expression, the impact of any
anti-counterfeiting strategy on s becomes prohibitively complex to obtain any analytical result.
Thus we conduct extensive numerical experiments to examine the e¤ects of anti-counterfeiting
strategies. We use the same parameters in Table 6 as in Table 5. For each case with  = 0 and
 = 0:5, there are 1024 scenarios in which we can investigate the anti-counterfeiting strategies that
change quality or price from the case with no counterfeiter to the optimal levels. On the other
hand, similar to Table 5, there are 768 scenarios for which we can examine the anti-counterfeiting
strategies that reduce  or increase . Table 6 can be read similarly to Table 5.
Table 6. E¤ects of Anti-counterfeiting Strategies in the Extended Model
 = 0  = 0:5
B " D # ECSD " B " D # ECSD "
qmB ! qB 1 0.320 0.672 1 0.998 0.647
wmB ! wB 1 0.508 0.805 1 0.998 0.647
 # no change no change 0 0.135 1 0.135
 " 1 1 1 0.779 1 0.798
Table 6 shows that the e¤ects of anti-counterfeiting strategies remain directionally true in this
extended model. For example, as the price changes from wmB to w

B , 

D and ECS

D can increase
or decrease; this is consistent with Proposition 4. Also, as stated in Proposition 5, when  = 0,
reducing  has no impact on B and 

D ; but decreases ECS

D , whereas increasing  reduces 

D
and increases B as well as ECS

D ; when  > 0, reducing  or increasing  decreases 

D , but it
can increase or decrease B and ECS

D . One notable exception is that when  = 0; changing q
m
B
to qB can increase 

D although it always decreases 

D in the base model. This happens because
of the additional lever the licit distributor has (i.e., determining pB as well as s): in response to
the change of qB; the distributor can increase the aggregate demand for both brand-name and
counterfeit goods by reducing pB: As a result, we nd that the distributor may increase or decrease
s in response to this strategy, which thus creates a non-monotonic e¤ect on D .
In the second case, the licit distributor chooses pB to maximize (pB wB)

1  pBqB

:We obtain
the optimal retail price: pB =
wB+qB
2 : Di¤erent from the rst case, p

B does not depend on the
fraction of counterfeits s or the fraction of proactive consumers : To nd the optimal fraction s,
the licit distributor solves the following problem:
max
s
(1 s)
2
wB+qB
2   swD   (1  s)wB
	n
2  (wB+qB)(1 s)qB+s(fD+qB)  
(1 )(wB+qB)
qB
o
  sl:
In the case when  = 0, we can obtain from the rst-order condition that s = 12  (qB wB)
2+4lqB
4(wB wD)(qB wB) .
By substituting s into (8) and solving max
wD
D(wD; fD), we obtain wD and the corresponding
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expected prot of the deceptive counterfeiter D as follows:
wD = wB 
q
wB [(qB wB)2+4lqB ]
2(qB wB) and 

D = (1 )wD
n
1
2  
q
(qB wB)2+4lqB
8wB(qB wB)
o
(12   wB2qB )  tf2D h:
From wD and 

D , we can verify that several insights from the base model continue to hold.
For example, as the risk of the licit distributor selling counterfeits increases with l, the deceptive
counterfeiter has to reduce his price wD to compensate for the increased risk, resulting in a decrease
in his expected prot D . Also, the deceptive counterfeiter always chooses the lower bound f for
his functional quality in the market with no proactive consumers. The following corollary shows
that the main results from the base model continue to hold in this case.
Corollary 3 Suppose the licit distributor decides the retail price pB as if he does not sell the
deceptive counterfeit. Then there exists l such that if l > l; Propositions 3 and 4 continue to hold
except that the conditions in part (c) are di¤erent.
Proof: When the deceptive counterfeiter exists in the market with  = 0, we obtain the following
B after substituting s
 and wD into mB in (6):
B = (wB   cB)

1
2   wB2qB
 h
(1  )
n
1
2 +
q
(qB wB)2+4lqB
8wB(qB wB)
o
+ 
i
  tBq2B:
From the rst order condition, qB =
wB(wB cB)
4tBq
2
B
n
1
4(1  )(2 +
q
2[(qB wB)2+4lqB ]
wB(qB wB) ) + 
o
+ (1 )(wB cB)[(qB wB)
2 4lqB ]
16tBqB
p
2wB(qB wB)[(qB wB)2+4lqB ]
; which is decreasing in l if l is su¢ ciently large. On the other
hand, qmB =
wB(wB cB)
4tBq
2
B
, which does not depend on l: Thus, there exists l such that if l > l, we have
qB < q
m
B : The proof of p

B is similar and hence omitted. To establish the result in Proposition
3(b), it su¢ ces to show that D is increasing in qB: In the expression of 

D above, (
1
2   wB2qB ) is
increasing in qB and f12  
q
(qB wB)2+4lqB
8wB(qB wB) g is increasing in qB if l is su¢ ciently large. Therefore,
there exists l such that if l > l, D is increasing in qB: The non-monotonicity of 

D (with respect
to pB) and ECSD are shown in Table 7. 
Corollary 3 shows that our main results in the base model continue to hold as long as the licit
distributor faces a signicant penalty if getting caught by the authorities, which is true in most
countries (see §3). The intuition is that in such a case, the counterfeiter o¤ers a low wholesale price
to the distributor to compensate for the high risk so that the distributors margin from selling the
counterfeit is high. As a result, the quality strategy discussed in Proposition 3, which reduces the
aggregate demand, still discourages the licit distributor from taking the risk of selling the counterfeit
and results in a lower s in this case. Similarly, the pricing strategy discussed in Proposition 4
leads to the same behavior of the distributor because it still reduces the aggregate demand and
increases the distributors margin from selling the counterfeit.
When  > 0; the closed-form expressions of s; wD and f

D do not exist. We conduct a
numerical study similar to the rst case using the same set of parameters. A summary of the
results is presented in Table 7. Comparing Table 7 with Table 6, we can verify that the dominant
e¤ects are the same in both cases. Therefore, the e¤ects of anti-counterfeiting strategies remain
directionally true in all cases.
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Table 7. E¤ects of Anti-counterfeiting Strategies in the Extended Model
 = 0  = 0:5
B " D # ECSD " B " D # ECSD "
qmB ! qB 1 0.500 0.688 1 0.990 0.730
wmB ! wB 1 0.523 0.676 1 0.990 0.730
 # no change no change 0 0.500 1 0.500
 " 1 1 1 0.645 1 0.656
Appendix D. Details of Consumer Survey
Respondents of our survey are college students and faculty with ages from 18 to 50. The number of
respondents is 86 in the U.S., and it is 80 in China. Two questions were asked in the questionnaire:
(1) Are you aware of the sale of counterfeits in each of the above product categories; and (2) For each
product category in which you are aware of the sale of counterfeits, do you take into account the risk
of getting a counterfeit and therefore discount the value of the product when you purchase a brand-
name product at a full price in a legal store? Those customers who answered yes to (1) are considered
Aware, and those customers who answered yes to both (1) and (2) are considered Proactive.
The absolute numbers may be escalated because respondents may be reminded of counterfeits by
the questionnaire. Our survey indicates that being awareof the existence of counterfeits di¤ers
from being proactive.One may explain such di¤erence from cognitive psychology (e.g., Bendoly
et al. 2010, Goldsmith and Amir 2010, and references therein); for example, it may be due to
a positive-outcome biasor wishful thinkingcaused by overestimating the probability of good
things happening.
Additional References
Bendoly, E., R. Croson, P. Goncalves, K. Schultz. 2010. Bodies of knowledge for research in
behavioral operations. Production and Operations Management 19(4) 434-452.
Goldsmith, K., O. Amir. 2010. Can uncertainty improve promotions? Journal of Marketing
Research 47(6) 1070-1077.
45
